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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
KAARYN GUSTAFSON*
The welfare system and the criminal justice system in the United States
are becoming ever more tightly interwoven. Scholars, however, have not
yet examined the processes involved in these developments and what these
developments mean for both the welfare system and for criminal
jurisprudence. Many people, including welfare recipients, treat the welfare
and criminal justice systems as analytically distinct. As a practical matter,
however, the systems now work in tandem.
This Article maps the criminalization of welfare. First, this Article
describes the social construction of welfare fraud, tracing how "welfare
queens" and welfare cheating came to be the targets of much governmental
attention and resources. The Article then describes the various ways that
criminal justice goals and strategies have become embedded in the welfare
system, as well as the ways that the welfare system has become a tool of law
enforcement. Next, the Article examines the treatment of welfare recipients
in the courts, where the poor have been relegated to an inferior status of
rights-bearing citizenship, a status on par with parolees and probationers.
In the end, the Article encourages more careful policy analysis of these
criminalizing practices, proposes a de-coupling of the economic security
and crime control functions of the state, and offers recommendations for
ensuring the constitutional rights of welfare recipients. Specifically,
administrative and criminal procedures must adapt to the transformations
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in welfare law to ensure that welfare recipients enjoy basic constitutional
protections. More research is suggested to measure the unmeasured and
the externalized costs associated with the criminalization of welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
The word welfare is now commonly used pejoratively-as in "welfare
mother" or "welfare queen." We often hear the word welfare used to
describe a bureaucratic mess or to describe economically and socially
marginalized populations. Lost in these contemporary understandings of
welfare is the association of welfare with wellbeing, particularly collective,
economic wellbeing. Many of the current welfare policies and practices are
far removed from promoting the actual welfare of low-income parents and
their children. The public desire to deter and punish welfare cheating has
overwhelmed the will to provide economic security to vulnerable members
of society. While welfare use has always borne the stigma of poverty, it
now also bears the stigma of criminality. This change in perspective has
under-examined implications for both welfare law and criminal law. This
Article examines those implications.
Over the last several decades, criminal law enforcement goals,
strategies, and perspectives have grown entangled with the welfare system,
a putatively benevolent arm of the state. Government welfare policies
increasingly treat the poor as a criminal class, and the treatment of low-
income women as criminals has occurred at all levels of government-
federal, state, and local. The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation
required states to implement measures to control welfare fraud.1 While
states have approached the policing of welfare fraud with varying levels of
zeal, there is a clear trend toward toughness on welfare recipients who run
2
afoul of regulations or who fail to comply with welfare rules.
Perhaps no state has been tougher on welfare fraud than California.
California is one of the most aggressive states not only in investigating and
prosecuting welfare fraud cases, but also in welcoming law enforcement
into the welfare system. 3 Even before receipt of a first issuance of a grant,
1 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, Title IX, § 911, 110 Stat. 2105, 2353 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)
(2006)); see also H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 1996 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, WMCP 104-14, app. L (104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1996) (summarizing, inter alia,
the fraud control requirements for states).
2 See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text (discussing state sanction rules for
welfare recipients in California and other states).
3 See infra notes 242-276 and accompanying text (discussing history of home searches of
welfare recipients in California); note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the preference
for criminal penalties over civil penalties for welfare cheating in California).
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an applicant for welfare is reminded of the welfare system's punitive rules
and undergoes state scrutiny otherwise limited to criminal offenders. A
welfare recipient has likely signed documents informing her that her
welfare grant will be reduced or terminated if she has a boyfriend move in
without informing the state, if she fails to vaccinate her children, or if she is
convicted of a drug charge. She has probably signed a document stating
that any child she conceives and gives birth to while on welfare will be
excluded from calculations of household financial need. Her Social
Security number has been matched against state and national criminal
records to make sure that she is not someone who should be incarcerated,
that she does not have an outstanding arrest warrant, and that she has not
been convicted of a drug-related crime. The financial information she has
provided has been matched against various employment databases, IRS
records, and Franchise Tax Board records to see that her lack of income is
verifiable. Her personal information has been entered into the welfare
system's database, which may be accessed by law enforcement officers
without any basis for suspicion that she has engaged in any wrongdoing.
She has been photographed and fingerprinted. And all of this has occurred
before she has received a single welfare check.
Particular California counties are especially zealous in policing welfare
fraud. San Diego, for example, takes a more proactive approach to welfare
cheating than other California counties. In 1997 the County established a
program known as Project 100%. 4 Under the program, all individuals who
apply for California's welfare program, known as CalWORKs, are subject
to an unannounced home visit by a plain-clothed welfare fraud investigator,
who is deputized and employed by the local prosecutor's office.5 Home
visits occur before benefits are issued, and consist of an interview and a
walk-through of the home. Investigators may, and do, look inside closets,
bathroom cabinets, laundry baskets, and trash cans during the walk-
through.6 Welfare applicants are informed that the home visits are designed
to verify their eligibility. Anyone who refuses consent for the interview or
walk-through will automatically have her welfare application denied.8 If
the home visit and walk-through reveals any evidence of criminal activity,
the county investigator may make a referral for criminal investigation. 9
4 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. 00 CV 1467 JM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27538, *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
' Id. at *5-6.
6 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
7Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 919 n.3.
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San Diego County's practices, some of the most aggressive in the
country, are emblematic of the broader trends in both welfare provision and
the intermingling of the welfare and criminal justice systems. Nationwide,
welfare applicants are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves.
Low-income families find their lives heavily surveilled and regulated-not
only by welfare officials, but also by the criminal justice system. And low-
income individuals may not be aware of the complex rules and regulations
that take effect when applying for government benefits or of the many ways
the government surveilles their actions. Policing the poor and protecting
taxpayer dollars from misuse have taken priority over providing for the
poor. Regulating the behavior of the poor and deterring fraud are now the
objects of political attention and government resources, even when the
goals of such regulation are unclear and the methods of deterrence are
unevaluated and costly.
More than forty-five years ago, Professor Charles Reich wrote that it
would undermine the fundamental purposes of welfare provision to "violate
the sanctity of the home and degrade and humiliate recipients." 10  Yet
today, some of the key purposes of welfare policies are to regulate the home
and to degrade welfare recipients to such a degree that they are deterred
from using welfare.1
The term criminalization is used in this Article to describe a web of
state policies and practices related to welfare. 12 There are several different
kinds of criminalizing policies and practices. First, there are a number of
10 Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE
L.J. 1347, 1360 (1963).
11 Norma M. Riccucci, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Intrastate Variation in the
Implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Policies, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 89, 102-03 (2005) (finding that frontline welfare administrators in Michigan
view reducing the number of people on welfare to be a state policy priority).
12 The term criminalization of poverty is frequently used by advocates for the homeless
to describe ordinances, such as panhandling statutes and anti-loitering statutes, and selective
enforcement targeting homeless individuals. See, e.g., METRO ATLANTA TASK FORCE FOR
THE HOMELESS, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (1993); David M. Smith, A Theoretical
and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 487 (1994). I use the term more broadly, however, to include all of the poor who use,
or even apply for, means-tested public benefits.
A number of sociologists use the term criminalization of poverty to describe an element
of neoliberalism that involves the mass incarceration of poor people of color. See, e.g.,
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, COMMUNITY: SEEKING SAFETY IN AN INSECURE WORLD 120 (2001)
(describing the criminalization of the poor as the "ongoing exchange of population between
the ghettos and the penitentiaries, each serving as a huge and growing input source for the
other"); Lo'c Wacquant, The Penalization of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism, 31
CAPITULO CRIMINOLOGIcO 7, 16 (2003) (describing the criminalization of poverty in the
United States as "a sharp and brutal substitution of the social-welfare treatment of poverty by
penal treatment backed by all-out 'carceralization.').
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practices involving the stigmatization, surveillance, and regulation of the
poor. 13 These practices are historically embedded in aid programs to the
poor. As Part II of this Article describes, the welfare reforms implemented
near the end of the twentieth century raised these practices to a new level.
Second, many of the policies written into the federal and state welfare
reform laws assumed a latent criminality among the poor. The welfare
reform measures were aimed at excluding welfare recipients who had
engaged in illicit behavior (such as drug use or possession) in the past, and
were aimed at imposing harsh penalties on welfare recipients who engaged
in illicit behavior while receiving government benefits. 14 These policies
engaged the get-tough-on-crime approach used by the criminal justice
system.
The third type of criminalizing practices involved the growing
intersection between the welfare system and the criminal justice system.
This intersection includes not only overlapping goals and attitudes toward
the poor, but also collaborative practices and shared information systems
between welfare offices and various branches of the criminal justice system.
Both these systems are now preoccupied not with addressing social ills, but
rather with reducing the risks associated with social ills. Very concrete
examples of this criminalization exist in the welfare system-most notably,
aggressive investigations into and increasing prosecutions for welfare
fraud.1 5  These government practices, which involve both the welfare
offices and the criminal justice system, are leaving a large and growing
number of parents with criminal records and paying criminal penalties.
More troubling, the policing of welfare fraud typically occurs at the local
level, so that dramatically disparate rates of investigation and prosecution
appear to exist among counties, even those in a single state.
16
The following Part of this Article describes the historical and political
progression through which welfare fraud and welfare cheats became such a
concern in the United States. Part III then details some of the federal
programs and state and local practices that have in recent years contributed
to the criminalizing trends. That Part also examines the movement away
from civil penalties for welfare cheating and the increasingly aggressive
13 See infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text (discussing fingerprint imaging); notes
163-176 and accompanying text (discussing drug testing); notes 89-99 and accompanying
text (discussing administrative sanctions).
14 See infra notes 130-138 and accompanying text (discussing the felony drug exclusion);
notes 109-113 and accompanying text (discussing the fugitive felon provision).
15 See infra note 228 (discussing a trend among the states to punish welfare cheating
through criminal prosecution rather than through civil administrative remedies).
16 See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial discretion
and localized practices of punishing welfare cheating).
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pursuit and punishment of welfare cheating as a felony crime. Part IV
examines the tenuous and troubling state of constitutional protections for
the poor under recent case law. Finally, Part V proposes some policy
changes to address the problematic convergence of the welfare and criminal
justice systems. It also considers why legal scholars should become more
attentive to the intermingling of government programs and strategies and,
more specifically, attentive to the poor.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
A. FROM 1935 THOUGH THE 1960S: CHANGES IN WELFARE
DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE RISE OF MIDNIGHT SEARCHES
The criminalization of welfare recipients entails a long historical
process of public discourse and welfare policies infused with race, class,
and gender bias. 17 State and federal government aid programs developed in
the first half of the twentieth century supported white, male workers and the
white women and children dependent upon their wages while they excluded
a huge segment of poor women of color and their children.18 The Social
Security Act created Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), a program
specifically designed for poor mothers and their children and originally
intended to support the widows of working men. 19 After World War II, the
ADC rolls grew-from about 900,000 individuals in 1945 to approximately
three million in 1960.20 The proportion of families headed by divorced or
17 See generally KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM:
PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR 35 (2001) (using the term welfare
racism to describe "the various forms and manifestations of racism associated with means-
tested programs of public assistance for poor families"). Neubeck and Cazenave describe
"the abolition of [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)] and the substitution of
punitive welfare reform policies for the safety net needed by impoverished families" as the
"ultimate expression of welfare racism." Id. at 37. See also JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE 15 (1994) (arguing that "the motor of American history has been the continual
reconfiguration of racial inequality in the nation's social, political, and economic
institutions").
18 Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's
Compensation and Mothers'Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 124 (Linda Gordon
ed., 1990) (arguing that we should view "the welfare state as fundamentally divided into two
channels, one originally designed for white industrial workers and the other designed for
impoverished, white, working-class widows with young children").
19 See generally Nelson, supra note 18.
20 The Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) caseload in 1942 was 901,560. WINIFRED
BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 208 n.24 (1965). By the beginning of 1960, the number
of individuals receiving ADC had grown to 2,964,135 children and their adult caretakers.
Jules H. Berman, Public Assistance Under the Social Security Act, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 83, 88 (1960).
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unmarried mothers grew, while the proportion of families headed by
widows declined.21 In addition, the number of African-American families
receiving welfare rose, especially as poor African-American families,
seeking economic opportunity, migrated from southern agricultural areas to
the industrial hubs of the North. 2
Welfare offices in many states and locales adopted "suitable home"
and "substitute parent" rules, which were essentially morality standards,
and which were arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied, and commonly
excluded women of color from the welfare rolls, especially in the South.23
Notwithstanding a 1961 rule issued by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare barring the arbitrary application of suitable home requirements,
many welfare offices continued to engage in midnight raids on the homes of
ADC recipients in order to police "man in the house" rules.24 The stated
reason for surprise visits was to catch men sleeping in the homes of women
receiving welfare. Unmarried women with men in their beds were deemed
morally unfit and their households therefore unsuitable for assistance.25 In
addition, the men discovered in the homes were considered household
breadwinners who had hidden their income support from the aid office.26
The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to police and punish the
sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government
support of able-bodied men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce
the idea that families receiving aid were entitled to no more than near-
desperate living standards.
21 Id. at 106.
22 FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 184-89 (updated ed. 1993).
23 BELL, supra note 20, at 76 (explaining that the rules "had no standing in the general
state statutes" and tended most heavily to affect African Americans). These morality
standards were indeed generally intended as tools of racial oppression. In response to a
school desegregation order by a federal court, the Louisiana state legislature passed a
"segregation package" that included welfare legislation designed to economically
disempower African Americans in the state. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 17, at 70,
74. The legislation included welfare reforms excluding from public benefits women who
had, in the last five years, lived in a common-law marriage or who had given birth outside of
marriage. Id. at 71. The legislation rendered ineligible "6,000 families with 22,500
children-95 percent of whom were African American." Id.
24 Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1248 (1965).
25 BELL, supra note 20, at 41-46 (describing the suitable home requirements); id. at 87-92
(describing surveillance of welfare mothers by welfare caseworkers).
26 Id. at 77-78.
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Midnight raids on welfare recipients continued for most of the 1960s. 27
During that time, a number of publicized cases of welfare fraud charges
resulted from the raids.28 In many of those cases, though, the men, not the
women, were charged with fraud. Men found residing with women
receiving welfare aid were treated as the welfare cheats.29 The prosecutions
of men, rather than women, suggest that the welfare and law enforcement
officials considered women to be easily manipulated by the men, but
ultimately blameless in the cheating. This view of the innocence of women,
however, changed over time.
By the mid-1960s, low-income women of color were being blamed for
all sorts of social problems. An oft-cited 1965 report by Daniel Patrick
Moynihan promoted the idea that the problems of inner cities-poverty,
joblessness, and crime-could be traced to a "tangle of pathology"
perpetuated by unmarried black mothers.30 The Moynihan Report identified
family disorganization and disintegration among poor African Americans as
a source of social, moral, and economic instability in the United States.31
The report stated that "[a]s a direct result of this high rate of divorce,
separation, and desertion, a very large percent of Negro families are headed
by females. While the percentage of such families among whites has been
27 See generally Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 232-33 (Cal. 1967)
(holding unannounced early morning searches invalid under the California Constitution).
These surprise searches, done without warrants, were conducted in the early morning by
teams of both fraud investigators and social workers. Id. at 225. Surprise home visits in
California stopped after an Alameda County social worker, Benny Max Parrish, refused to
continue participating in Sunday morning raids of welfare recipients' homes. Id. at 226, 234.
Parrish, after being fired for insubordination, challenged his dismissal, claiming he had been
asked to participate in illegal activity. Id. at 226. The California Supreme Court held that
the raids violated welfare recipients' rights to privacy and were unreasonable, and that
Parrish was justified in refusing to participate. Id. at 234.
28 NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 17, at 96-97. In 1962, the Senate Appropriations
Committee held hearings on welfare fraud in the District of Columbia. Id. According to
Kenneth Neubeck and Noel Cazenave, the hearings were sparked by segregationist U.S.
Senator Robert Byrd, who was preoccupied not only by the rising welfare caseloads in the
District, but also by both the rising population of African Americans in the District and the
recent passage of the Twenty-Third Amendment giving D.C. residents the right to vote. Id.
at 92-104.
29 Id. at 102. Neubeck and Cazenave note that in congressional discussions of welfare
cheating in this era, unmarried men in intimate relationships with women receiving welfare
"were portrayed as being, on the one hand, men who exploited welfare-reliant mothers and
their children, and on the other hand, as men who provided for them. Both actions violated
ADC policy, and, taken separately, each depiction presented a very negative view of these
men, their motives, and their actions." Id.
30 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE
FOR NATIONAL ACTION 30 (1965).
31 Id. at 5-6, 14.
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dropping since 1940, it has been rising among Negroes. '32 Even worse,
according to the report, many of the children in female-headed households
received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, formerly ADC),
a program originally designed for widows and orphans.33 In Moynihan's
popular portrayal, low-income African-American mothers were a social
threat because they gave birth to and raised sons who became the criminal,
urban underclass.
In 1968, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that halted the
"substitute father" rule, which had stipulated that any man cohabiting with a
mother should be considered a substitute father and should be held
responsible for supporting the entire family.34 While the decision lifted the
stigma of welfare cheating from fathers and boyfriends, it also intensified
the stigma on mothers. The Supreme Court held in King v. Smith that the
substitute-father presumption was inconsistent with the intent of the Social
Security Act to provide for needy children.35 The plaintiff, Sylvester Smith,
was an African-American widow and mother of four whose welfare case
had been closed when the welfare department found that a man (who was
married with nine children of his own) sometimes spent the night in her
house.3 6 As a result of King v. Smith, welfare offices devoted markedly less
attention to the men involved in the lives of women receiving welfare.
Policymakers instead turned their full attention to welfare mothers.
B. THE 1970S: GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT GOVERNMENT WASTE
AND ABOUT CRIME
Beginning in the 1970s, it became more difficult for welfare recipients
to live on their welfare grants. Throughout the 1970s, '80s, and '90s, the
value of the welfare grant, adjusted for inflation, declined dramatically.
The weighted average maximum benefit per three-person family was $854
in 1969 (in 2001 dollars), but plummeted to $456 by 2001 . It became
increasingly hard for welfare recipients to cover their most basic
expenses-food, clothing, and rent-with their welfare grants. Unable to
survive on welfare checks and facing barriers to employment, many welfare
recipients turned to other sources of income, whether help from kin or
participation in underground labor markets, and attempted to hide those
32 Id. at 9.
3' Id. at 12.
34 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
" Id. at 329.
36 Id. at 315.
37 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE:
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS tbl.TANF 6 (2003), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators03/apa.htm#ttanf6 (last visited May 15, 2009).
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sources from the welfare office for fear of losing the small checks they
received.38
Also in the 1970s, as a part of welfare reforms under President Richard
Nixon, the AFDC system became more bureaucratic. 39  The practice of
social workers visiting the homes of welfare recipients and verifying
financial need ended.40 Office caseworkers, hired to replace the social
workers, processed the routine paperwork that welfare recipients regularly
submitted to the office to document their continuing financial need. In a
process known as "churning," the federal government increased the amount
of information and paperwork required to determine welfare eligibility, and
denied benefits to low-income families who failed to keep up with the
paperwork.41 Income-eligible families were removed from the aid rolls for
their failures to provide verification documents in a timely manner.42 Home
visits by welfare caseworkers, particularly unannounced visits, virtually
38 See generally KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE WORK 147-84 (1997); SUDHIR ALLADI
VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT 46 (2000) (discussing how families often reported men as
absent from the household so that they could qualify for cash aid under AFDC).
39 For a detailed description of this administrative "churning," see PIVEN & CLOWARD,
supra note 22, at 373-81.
40 Id. at 375-76 ("Forms written in legalese were mailed out (as often as monthly) asking
poorly-educated recipients with erratic mail delivery to fill in the blanks and provide
documentation justifying the continuation of checks.").
41 Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Ctr. on Soc. Welfare Policy & Law, Quality
Control in Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Accountability, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1385 (1989) ("Extreme verification requirements create a cycle,
known as 'churning.' Eligible families have their applications rejected or their cases closed
for failure to verify, and then they reapply to gain or regain benefits.").
42 See Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc.
SERV. REV. 3, 13 (1984) ("[E]xclusive concern with quality control errors resulted in
diminished attention to helping recipients or concern about whether they fully received all to
which they were entitled."). The Reagan Administration began penalizing states that
overpaid benefits to the poor. Under an "error rate reduction system" implemented by the
Reagan Administration, a state that could be shown to have an error rate of more than 5% on
food stamp cases lost out on a portion of the funds it would otherwise have received from
Washington. Michael J. Puma & David C. Hoaglin, Food Stamp Payment Error Rates: Can
State-Specific Performance Standards Be Developed?, 85 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 891, 891
(1990) (noting that between 1981 and 1985, the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture assessed "423.5 million in liabilities against 49 states" for their
food stamp error rates). Only overpayment was penalized; from 1973 to 1977,
underpayment to an eligible recipient, or the failure to serve an eligible person altogether,
did not count as an error for the purpose of that calculation. Casey & Mannix, supra note
41, at 1381, 1382. This system created a strong incentive for welfare administrators to err on
the side of caution in determining eligibility for aid. In fact, hunger rose in the United States
during the early 1980s. See Joseph Lelyveld, Hunger in America: The Safety Net Has
Shrunk but It's Still in Place, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1985, at 20.
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stopped during the 1970s.43 During that period, welfare recipients gained
greater expectations of privacy in their own homes.
Governmental scrutiny of administrative records, however, increased.
Particularly during the Carter Administration, the news media brought
greater attention to fraud in government spending, a concern that first arose
in the context of military contracts after glaring examples of waste and
abuse were exposed. 4 Congress passed, and President Carter signed, the
Inspector General Act of 1978, which authorized the President to appoint
Inspector Generals to twelve federal administrative agencies.45 Data
collection and analysis were increased throughout government programs.46
In the 1970s, the image of low-income mothers took a particularly
negative turn. As discussed below, California Governor (later President)
Ronald Reagan used the symbol of the "welfare queen" to propel his ideas
on limited government and increased crime control.47 Reagan used
references to the welfare queen to portray an image of widespread depravity
and criminality among low-income women of color.48 Despite the factual
inaccuracies of Reagan's descriptions, the symbol of the welfare queen
resonated with the public.
Welfare cheating had always been an issue in poverty politics. Senator
Robert Byrd made a highly publicized investigation of welfare fraud in
43 Casey & Mannix, supra note 41, at 1386 (noting that home visits declined in the
1970s, though also noting that the Department and Health and Human Services instructed
states in 1984 that they might return to home visits to reduce overpayments to welfare
recipients).
44 David Burnham, U.S. Agencies Starting to Bolster Meager Defenses Against Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1978, at Al.
45 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 3, 92 Stat. 1101, 1101-02. The
Inspector General's duties were to root out waste and fraud in government programs, and
report instances of abuse directly to the U.S. Attorney General.
46 A 1978 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Inspector General's report
revealed costly fraud and abuse in the programs the department oversaw. OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY 1, 1978-
DECEMBER 31, 1978 (1979). The Inspector's report criticized, in particular, defaulted loans
in the student aid program and abuses by medical providers, particularly pharmacies and
physicians, in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Id. at 58-68, 122. (The report gives
the impression that overpayments to AFDC recipients and fraud by government officials in
both the cash aid and food stamp programs, though occurring, were problems secondary to
the student aid and medical aid abuses.) The Inspector General's recommendations for
attacking fraud, abuse, and error in income maintenance programs, such as AFDC, targeted
improvements in information systems and better data exchange between government
agencies.





Washington, D.C. in 1962.49 In 1972, when President Richard Nixon was
considering an overhaul of the welfare system, Senator Russell Long of
Louisiana declared that "the welfare system, as we know it today, is being
manipulated and abused by malingerers, cheats and outright frauds."50
While distrust of those low-income adults unattached to the wage labor
market had always existed in the United States, it appeared to grow
throughout the 1970s. Concerns about welfare cheats, in particular, began
to rise. Beginning in 1977, those who applied for food stamps had to
disclose their Social Security numbers to receive benefits. 51 This marked
the first use of an extensive data exchange using Social Security numbers
among government agencies, and the beginning of computer data tracking
of the poor.
That is not to say that there were not individuals who defrauded the
welfare system. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were a few
52particularly notable cases of welfare fraud in large U.S. cities. It was not
49 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS
OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 115 (1999).
50 RUSSELL B. LONG, S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., WELFARE CHEATING
(Comm. Print 1972).
51 Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 106-171, 114 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (1977)).
52 The first nationally publicized case made news in 1974 when police began
investigating forty-seven-year-old Chicago mother Linda Taylor for welfare fraud. Taylor
herself triggered the investigation by reporting to police that fourteen thousand dollars in
cash, jewelry, and furs had been stolen from her home. Welfare and Pension Swindle Laid
to Woman of Many Aliases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 58. Early newspaper coverage of
the case reported that Taylor was being investigated for using as many as fourteen different
aliases over twenty-eight years to collect perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars in welfare
and social security payments. Id. The early estimates of her fraud were perhaps
overestimates. In March, Taylor-who investigators and the press called the "welfare
queen" -was found guilty of welfare fraud and perjury for using two aliases to collect eight
thousand dollars in wrongful payments over the course of twenty-three months. Chicago
Relief 'Queen' Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1977, at 8.
Then, in 1978, Barbara Jean Williams, a thirty-three-year-old African-American mother
from Compton, California, was convicted of ten counts of welfare fraud and twelve counts of
perjury. Woman Guilty of $240,000 Welfare Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1978, at A4.
According to a newspaper account of the investigation:
Officials were alerted by an anonymous telephone tip to feed the name of Barbara Jean
Thompson, one of Williams' alleged aliases, into the computer. The computer printout showed a
pattern of identical or similar names for the recipients' alleged needy children. Williams was
later accused of filing for aid in 10 welfare offices and collecting a total of $239,587 from
September 1971 to February 1978.
Id. At the time she applied for aid, the welfare system had not yet been computerized,
making it easy for a willful criminal to apply for aid by opening multiple cases under
different names. Williams was ultimately sentenced to eight years in jail for cheating the
system. 'Queen of Welfare' Ordered Jailed in $239,500 Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1978,
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happenstance that a number of welfare fraud cases involving double-
dipping crooks were uncovered in the late 1970s, as it was then that the
AFDC system was computerized and that identifying and documenting
cases of fraud became much easier for welfare officials.53 What may have
appeared to the public and to policymakers to be a spike in cases of welfare
fraud was actually a sudden improvement in the ability of officials to root
out fraud effectively. And while this transformation-the computerization
of the system-might have been heralded as a means of both providing aid
more efficiently and policing fraud more effectively, the transformation
marked instead a period of zealous attacks on welfare recipients and a
public perception that welfare cheating was on the rise.
C. THE 1980S: THE RISE OF THE WELFARE QUEEN
The election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 marked a
significant transition in public opinions towards the poor and in government
services for the poor. From the first moment of his bid for presidential
election, Ronald Reagan used anecdotes about welfare queens to exemplify
everything he believed was wrong with government programs--excessive
spending on domestic programs and misuse of government money.
54
Reagan apparently merged the identities of two well-known women
convicted of welfare fraud-Linda Taylor, the Chicago "welfare queen,"
and Barbara Jean Williams, the Cadillac-driving "Queen of Welfare" from
Compton-into a single persona who starred in an often-used anecdote.
Reagan regularly exaggerated the number of aliases used by these women
so that his welfare queen had 100 of them. 55 The welfare queen played a
prominent role in Reagan's presidential campaign.
Programs providing assistance to the poor changed after Reagan took
office. Whereas Nixon, during his 1973 State of the Union Address,
proudly stated that federal spending on food assistance programs had tripled
at A10. The New York Times reported that Williams was known as the "Queen of Welfare."
Id. In coverage of her court case, the New York Times and the Washington Post repeatedly
noted that Williams drove a Cadillac. Id.
53 Text of White House Message to Congress on Proposal to Overhaul Welfare System,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1977, at 40.
54 See 'Welfare Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, supra note 47. The article
noted that while campaigning for the Republican presidential primaries in New Hampshire,
Reagan mentioned Linda Taylor "at nearly every stop." Id. Reagan reported greatly
exaggerated facts, telling voters that Taylor had used eighty names, when, in fact, the
indictment brought against her charged her with using four aliases. Id. The article noted that
"[t]he 'welfare queen' item in Mr. Reagan's repertoire is one of several that seem to be at
odds with the facts." Id.
55 David S. Broder, Still Learning to Be the Opposition, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1981, at
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during his presidency, Reagan regarded those same programs as
government waste.5 6 Under Reagan's direction, the federal government cut
funding for food stamps in 1981. 5' The federal government also tightened
the eligibility requirements for the federal school lunch program,
eliminating 2.6 million children from the program.58
Reagan also began a government crackdown on "waste, fraud and
abuse"-a phrase that became a dominant theme in his second campaign.
The crackdown, however, was targeted rather than universal. Upon taking
office, Reagan abruptly fired all of the Inspectors General.5 9 Rather than
focusing on waste and fraud throughout federal government, President
Reagan focused instead on welfare fraud, particularly on fraud committed
by welfare recipients. In Reagan's view, the poor, and not the welfare
bureaucracies, were the sources of fraud and waste. In the 1980s, some
Democrats began accusing Republicans of using "[w]aste, fraud and abuse"
as code words for "a budget-cutting program that would take more money
away from poor blacks and Hispanics, and relatively less from middle-class
whites., 60  Republicans replied that the disparate racial effects of the
policies were not intentional. 61 Despite the congressional concern about
welfare fraud by recipients, the Washington Post reported that an audit of
the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly Health, Education
and Welfare) released shortly before Reagan fired its Inspector General
found that "[t]he greatest cheaters ... are not individual welfare or health
care recipients, but doctors and pharmacists and other providers of services
who overbill the government.
' 62
Again, that is not to say that cheating welfare recipients did not exist.
63
But rather than treat a few exceptional instances of criminal activity as the
56 Robert Pear, Reagan's Social Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1982, at Al.
57 Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamp Trims Sought by Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981,
at A23.
58 Pear, supra note 56.
59 Charles R. Babcock & Patrick Tyler, Fired U.S. Waste-Fighters Bare Government
Foulups, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1981, at Al.
60 Steven V. Roberts, '82 Election Preview: Making Money, Making Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1981, at A28 (summarizing comments by California Democratic Representative
Tony Coelho).
61 House Representative Guy Vander Jagt, a Michigan Republican, said, "'I suspect that
a disproportionate share of blacks are on welfare, and that a disproportionate share of
welfare fraud is committed by blacks .... But people are not mad at black welfare chiselers,
they're mad at welfare chiselers, period."' Id.
62 Babcock & Tyler, supra note 59; see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 46.
63 In December of 1980, after Reagan's successful presidential campaign, another
prominent welfare fraud case surfaced in California. Dorothy Woods, a thirty-eight-year-old
African-American mother of six living in Pasadena, was charged with welfare fraud for, like
Barbara Jean Williams, creating multiple (twelve) aliases for herself and using the names of
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exceptions they were, politicians-and the media and public, as well-
adopted these cases as typifying poor, African-American women on
welfare. These "welfare queens" were treated not merely as stereotypes of
poor black mothers on aid, but as archetypes-perfect examples of what
welfare recipients become over the course of years on the dole.64 And
fictitious children to receive large payments from the AFDC program. Coast Woman Admits
$377,458 Welfare Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1983, at A16; Woman's Aid Claims for 38
Children Are Examined, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1980, at 31. Again, the news coverage
highlighted the welfare cheat's automobiles of choice, in this case a Rolls Royce, a Mercedes
Benz, and a Cadillac. Woman's Aid Claims for 38 Children Are Examined, supra. Woods
was jailed in November of 1981 and, in March of 1983, pleaded guilty to forty-one criminal
counts, including forgery, perjury, and welfare fraud. Coast Woman Admits $377,458
Welfare Fraud, supra. According to prosecutors, Woods had fraudulently collected
$377,458 in welfare between 1974 and 1980. Id. The media dubbed Woods the "Welfare
Queen," not only because of her luxury cars, but also because she lived in a large house with
a swimming pool. Requiem for the Welfare Queen, WASH. POST, June 29, 1983, at A18.
Woods's criminal activities were not limited to welfare fraud and did not end with her
fraud conviction. In 1987, Woods had her parole rescinded after the welfare office
discovered she had collected a welfare check for a son who was not living with her. Lois
Timnick, 'Welfare Queen 'Arrested on New Fraud Charges, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1987, at 3.
An administrative hearing, however, later determined that the welfare office had not
provided fair notice before terminating her benefits and that Woods had left her son with her
brother for a few weeks while searching for housing. The Region, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1987,
at 2. In 1993, after her release from prison, Woods became head of a Pasadena church
homeless shelter. Nicholas Riccardi, 'Welfare Queen' Held on Tax Fraud Charges, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at B3. Her life of freedom did not last long. In 1997, Woods was
again charged with fraud and pleaded guilty, this time for using the Social Security numbers
of clients at the homeless shelter, forging their signatures, and fraudulently filing and
collecting claims for earned-income tax credits. Official Business: Woman Pleads Guilty to
New Tax Fraud Charge, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1997, at B4.
64 See WAHNEEMA LUBIANO, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels:
Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS
ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 323, 332-
33 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("[T]he welfare queen is omnipresent in discussions about
'America's' present or future even when unnamed. All of those things are constantly in the
news (not that welfare queens were ever much out of the news)--urban crime, the public
schools, the crack trade, teenage pregnancy are all narratives in which 'welfare queen' is writ
large."). See generally ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC
IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN (2004) (discussing negative views of welfare recipients in
political debates and in public opinion).
The figure of the welfare queen offered (and continues to offer) contradictory stereotypes
about the rationality of poor women. On the one hand, the welfare queen stereotype
embodied a woman who was hyper-rational and enterprising, someone who was working the
system and milking taxpayer money from the government. This welfare queen was someone
who had decided to maximize her income by bearing more children and increasing her
government benefits rather than working. She also represented a mother who refused to
enter into marriage, which would jeopardize her benefits.
At the same time, the welfare queen stereotype portrayed welfare recipients as
uneducated, lazy, and irrational. A welfare queen was someone who did not, or perhaps
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Ronald Reagan's re-election campaign was spearheaded by an attack on
waste, fraud and abuse in welfare programs.65 Just as in President Reagan's
first bid for the White House, the welfare queen became a powerful symbol
in the 1984 presidential campaign.66
Where the welfare queen stereotype was accurate was in its
characterization of poverty and welfare as women's issues. Indeed, in
1984, two-thirds of the adults living below the poverty line were women,
and households headed by single mothers were five times more likely to
live in poverty than two-parent families. 67 Moreover, with rising divorce
rates and an increasing number of non-marital births in the United States,
the disproportionate representation of women and their children would
become a growing trend.
D. THE 1990S: WELFARE REFORM AND THE CONVERGENCE OF THE
WELFARE SYSTEM AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Vilifying the low-income mothers receiving welfare became a bi-
partisan project in the 1990s. Survey research revealed that Americans
associated welfare with African Americans and viewed the welfare system
as a program that rewarded laziness among African Americans. 68 "Welfare
dependency" became a keyword associated not only with economic risk and
social disorder, but also with crime.69
could not, pursue the long-term well-being of her family. She was someone unmotivated to
seek an education to improve her station, someone who refused to take the economic risk of
joining the paid labor force and leaving the welfare system. Worst of all, she had children
without regard for her inability to raise them in middle-class comfort. She neither
participated in the paid labor market nor took on the caretaking responsibilities for a working
husband. She simply drew upon taxpayer dollars with neither gratitude nor remorse.
While poverty is not exclusive to women of color who have children, black mothers have
come to bear much of the stigma associated with welfare. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 J. GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1993) ("Ideologically, in
America, single motherhood is Black.").
65 Choking Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1983, at A18 (noting that the Reagan
Administration's focus on "fraud, waste and abuse," described in the article as "Reagan
bugaboos," was making it difficult for destitute families to access public benefits).
66 Editorial, Reagan, Women and Poverty, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 1984 (noting that
Reagan's re-election efforts were aimed at middle-class women, while many of the budget
cuts he implemented during his first term most affected the poor women he labeled "welfare
queens").
67 WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 370-71 (5th ed. 1994).
68 GILENS, supra note 49, at 3.
69 HANCOCK, supra note 64, at 93-94 (conducting a content analysis of the Congressional
Record of the 104th Congress and finding the following terms arising frequently in debates
about welfare recipients: Culture of Poverty, Don't Work, Single-Parent Family,
Illegitimacy, Cross-Generational Dependency, Teen Mothers, Crime, and Overly Fertile);
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In the 1990s, states began to attack welfare recipients through
aggressive welfare fraud investigations and criminal prosecutions.7 °
California again became a leader in these new punitive approaches to
welfare reform. 71 By 1993, twenty-six other states had joined California in
establishing pre-eligibility fraud investigation units, which conducted
investigations of individuals applying for cash aid.7 2  The pre-eligibility
fraud investigation units checked on welfare applicants' assets, sources of
property, household composition, and address.73 Investigators conducted
their investigations by interviewing relatives, friends, neighbors, employers,
and landlords of welfare applicants; visiting and conducting surveillance of
applicants' homes; investigating financial resources through database
searches; and interviewing the welfare applicants themselves.74 In 1995, all
of the states that had established welfare fraud investigation units housed
them separately from the eligibility workers in order to avoid conflicts of
interest between government employees trying to provide for the poor and
those focused on deterring and capturing welfare fraud.75
California continued its leadership on "get-tough-on-welfare" reforms.
California's Republican governor, Pete Wilson, reduced the welfare grants
to needy families and increased the number of welfare fraud investigators in
see also Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274,
283 ("[I]n poverty discourses emanating from a broad spectrum of groups, these single
mothers have been lumped together with drug addicts, criminals, and other socially-defined
'degenerates' in the newly-coined category of 'underclass."').
70 Susan D. Bennett describes welfare office application procedures as "discouragement
practices" leading to "bureaucratic disentitlement." Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief but upon
the Terms of Coming into the House"-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and
Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2159 (1995). She explains
that discouragement practices tend to take four forms: "the demand for the applicant's
physical presence as a precondition to application, the physical isolation of the applicant in
the waiting room, the withholding of information from the applicant, and verification
extremism." Id. at 2161.
71 California began investigating applicants, not just welfare recipients, for fraud in the
1980s. A report by the 1996 U.S. Office of Inspector General notes:
California was the original pioneer to use pre-eligibility fraud investigative units, and their
program is one of the largest in the United Sates. It is also generally more aggressive than other
States in detecting fraud. For example, many California counties used trained peace officers
rather than social workers for investigators.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., REP. No. OEI-04-91-
00101, AFDC PRE-ELIGIBILITY FRAUD INVESTIGATIVE UNITS 3 (1995).
72 Id. at 2.
71 Id. at 6.
74 Id. at 8.
" Id. at 11-12.
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the state.76  In 1994 Governor Wilson authorized the electronic
fingerprinting of welfare recipients, even though legislative analysts, state
budget officials, and welfare officials said doing so was both costly and
unnecessary to address welfare fraud.77
In 1996, California legislators stiffened the penalties for welfare fraud.
Legislators passed bills that would permanently disqualify individuals
convicted of welfare fraud from ever receiving welfare again.78 At the same
time, they voted to reduce welfare benefits. 79 California also began shifting
the investigation and punishment of welfare cheating from the welfare
office to district attorneys. Beginning in July 1996, district attorneys rather
than staff from public social services agencies assumed the role of
conducting welfare overpayment investigations.80  Functionally,
California-like many other states-made it increasingly difficult for
welfare recipients to survive on their welfare grants alone, and shifted state
money from aiding low-income women to policing and punishing them
through the criminal justice system when they sought unreported income.
Then came an overhaul of the welfare system at the federal level. In
the debates leading up to the votes on the welfare legislation, federal
lawmakers employed dehumanizing rhetoric to describe welfare
81recipients. In a particularly vivid example of the dehumanization of
welfare recipients, John Mica, a Republican Congressional Representative
from Florida, held up a sign during a congressional debate that read, "Don't
feed the alligators." 82 On the House floor, Mica argued that providing aid
76 Wilson cut AFDC benefits by 5.8% in 1992. Jane Gross, U.S. Court Delays Welfare
Cutback, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at A10. Wilson also sought to provide reduced benefits
to welfare recipients who moved from other states, though a federal court prohibited that
restriction, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), a Supreme Court case holding
that residency restrictions on AFDC violate a constitutional right to travel. Id.
77 Carla Rivera, Experimental Fingerprint Program Targets Aid Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1994, at B4. A consultant to the Senate's Budget Committee noted that finger imaging
would raise the $72 million a year the state already spent on welfare fraud programs another
13% without significant increases in efficiency. Id.
78 Max Vanzi, Assembly OKs GOP-Backed Welfare Cuts, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at
A3.
79 Id.
80 Scott Steepleton, Countywide; Investigators Arrest 22 Welfare Recipients, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1997, at 3.
81 Beverly Horsburgh, Schrodinger's Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of
Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive
Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 531, 565-66 (1996)
(quoting lawmakers who associated women on welfare with caged animals such as wolves
and alligators).
82 Vanessa Gallman, 'Sit Down and Shut Up': Welfare Debate Turns Testy, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 25, 1995, at 8A.
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to poor women would do nothing but spur them to reproduce, entice them
to return for more free handouts, and threaten the general public safety.
83
Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act in 1996.84 The legislation eliminated the broad,
federally-governed AFDC program and ended cash aid as a federal
entitlement to all income-qualified families.85  Replacing AFDC
entitlements, the federal government distributed state block grants through a
federal program known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).86 The new welfare policies threatened that those who failed to
play by the rules-by meeting mandatory work requirements, by abiding by
behavior reforms, and by reporting all details of income and household
composition-would be harshly punished with new penalties.87 In addition,
states were allowed to place their own conditions upon receipt of welfare
and could establish time limits even shorter than the federal ones.8 8 Those
welfare recipients who failed to meet their obligations under the new
system would be excluded from benefits and have the safety net pulled out
from under them-in some cases permanently.
83 [1] represent Florida where we have many lakes and natural reserves. If you visit these areas,
you may see a sign like this that reads, "do not feed the alligators." We post these signs for
several reasons. First, because if left in a natural state, alligators can fend for themselves. They
work, gather food and care for their young.
Second, we post these warnings because unnatural feeding and artificial care creates
dependency. When dependency sets in, these otherwise able-bodied alligators can no longer
survive on their own.
141 CONG. REc. 9194 (1995) (statement of Representative Mica).
84 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42
U.S.C. (2006)).
85 Id. at Title I, § 401, 110 Stat. at 2261 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2006))
(specifying that the federal funds provided to states "shall not be interpreted to entitle any
individual or family to assistance .... ").
86 Id. at Title I, § 402, 110 Stat. at 2113-15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602
(2006)).
87 Id. at Title I, § 407, 110 Stat. at 2129-34 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607
(2006)) (describing mandatory work requirements); id. at Title I, § 404, 110 Stat. at 2124-28
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 604 (2006)) (allowing states to sanction a family's
welfare benefits if an adult fails to ensure that children attend school); id. at Title IX, § 902,
110 Stat. at 2347 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (2006)) (allowing states to
sanction welfare recipients who test positive for controlled substances).
81 Id. at Title I, § 408, 110 Stat. at 2140-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 609
(2006)) (allowing states discretion in determining the obligations of individual aid recipients




E. ESCALATING ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
During the welfare reform debates of the mid-1990s, politicians and
the public repeatedly championed the "carrot and stick" approach to
welfare.89 The new welfare system would not only include incentives, but
would also create a new system of disincentives and punishments. The
approach was designed to coax welfare recipients who were not
participating in the formal wage-labor market to seek steady employment
and leave the welfare system.90 There were a few incentives: increased
earnings disregards, increased availability of child care subsidies, and an
increased Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor. The true
underpinning of reform, however, came in the form of sanctions.
A welfare recipient's failure to comply with welfare rules and
regulations can result in a reduction or termination of the family's welfare
benefits; this is known as a sanction. Failing to comply can mean violating
welfare-to-work requirements, failing to fulfill the number of work hours
required, or merely missing a scheduled meeting at the welfare office. 91
One study of the sanctions imposed in three major cities found that such
missed appointments were the most common triggers for sanctions.92  In
California, the result of a sanction is a reduction of the adult's portion of aid
from the grant check; in 2008, this reduction amounted to $139 for a family
of three-a significant sum for a family living in poverty.
93
While many people assume that transitions from welfare to work
account for dramatic decreases in welfare caseloads, a number of studies
89 The many people who used this phrase seemed uncritical of the beast-of-burden
imagery that the phrase "carrot and stick" creates with relation to the poor individuals who
stand between the carrot and the stick. The phrase itself conjures up images of coerced,
unpaid labor and resonates with images of black servitude under slavery. Martin Gilens
notes that the public's negative attitudes towards the welfare system are inextricably tied to
racism and an aversion to providing African Americans with aid. GILENS, supra note 49, at
3 (noting that "welfare has become a 'code word' for race").
90 Carolyn Skomeck, Negotiators OK Welfare Bill: Carrot-and-Stick Reform Offers
Some Concessions to Clinton, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 31, 1996, at 2 (explaining that the
welfare reform bill had "a tough edge that would force people off public rolls and into
jobs").
91 Regulations set forth by the Department of Health and Human Services determine
general rules for all of the states, but the states determine what the work requirements will be
under their programs, and eligibility workers at local offices determine what counts as work
hours for individual welfare recipients.
92 Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Operating Within the Rules: Welfare Recipients' Experiences
with Sanctions and Case Closings, 76 Soc. SERV. REv. 387, 395 (2002).
93 JACOB ALEX KLERMAN & JANE MCCLURE BURSTAIN, RAND, SANCTIONS IN THE
CALWORKs PROGRAM xv (2008).
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indicate that sanctions actually account for much of the decline.94 Research
by Sanford Schram found evidence that "get-tough policies, especially strict
sanctions, have contributed to the roll declines and may have done so in
ways that forced people off even while they still needed assistance.
95
Like most policies under welfare reform, the policies regarding
sanctions vary dramatically from state to state. While some states, like
California, only reduce the adult's portion of aid under a sanction (known
as a "partial sanction"), thirty-six states implemented "full family
sanctions," meaning that if a parent fails to meet his or her work
requirement, cash aid to the entire family is cut off.96 In seventeen of these
states, full-family sanctions are immediate upon noncompliance with the
welfare rules; in the remaining nineteen states, full-family sanctions are
only instituted after multiple instances of non-compliance (referred to as a
"gradual full-family sanction"). 97 Wisconsin determines sanctions based on
the number of hours a welfare recipient has failed to perform. 98 In addition,
nineteen states eliminate food stamp benefits if an adult is non-compliant,
and twelve states eliminate Medicaid benefits to non-compliant adults.99
Sanctions are a routine occurrence. Researchers estimate that between
33% and 52% of TANF recipients have been sanctioned.100 More than half
94 See, e.g., Jacob Alex Klerman & Caroline Danielson, Why Did the Welfare Caseload
Decline? 2 (RAND, Working Paper No. WR-167, 2004) ("[O]ur simulations suggest only a
moderate role for any specific reforms in explaining the large observed drop in the welfare
caseload. We attribute about a fifth of the caseload decline to time limits and sanctions,
about a quarter to the economy, and about a third to a residual policy bundle; the remainder
of the decline is absorbed by unexplained time effects.").
95 Sanford F. Schram, Race and State Welfare Reform Choices: A Cause for Concern, in
FROM POVERTY TO PUNISHMENT: How WELFARE REFORM PUNISHES THE POOR 97 (Gary
Delgado ed., 2002).
96 LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., THE USE OF TANF
WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS tN ILLINOIS, NEW JERSEY, AND SOUTH CAROLINA 2 (2004).
97 Id.; see also State Policy Documentation Project, TANF Categorical Eligibility,
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/sanctions/sanctions.findings.htm (last visited May 15, 2009).
States may determine standards of "good cause" that will spare a household a sanction if an
adult was not in compliance with the work requirements or other state requirements of the
state welfare rules. Id. Good cause usually includes illness of the head of household, illness
of a child in the family, or lack of transportation. Id. The Center for Law and Social Policy
(CLASP) notes, however, that three states "do not have any type of process to resolve
sanction disputes before they are imposed." Id. This lack of procedural protection for
welfare recipients appears to be a violation of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which
holds that individuals are entitled to notice and a right to a fair hearing before denial of
governmental benefits.
98 PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 96, at 2.
99 LaDonna Pavetti, Welfare Policy in Transition: Redefining the Social Contract for
Poor Citizen Families with Children, 21 FOCUS, Fall 2000, at 44.
100 LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., REVIEW OF
SANCTION POLICIES AND RESEARCH STUDIES: FINAL LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2003); JANICE
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of a million families were subject to full-family sanctions from 1997
through 1999.101 Schram has shown that those states that have instituted the
punitive full-family sanctions are those with the largest populations of
African Americans. 102 Other researchers examining TANF sanctions found
that "limited education and being African American predict sanctioning
when [one] control[s] for a wide range of other personal and demographic
characteristics. ' '  In short, it appears the "carrot and stick" approach is
overwhelmingly being used as a stick against some of the most
marginalized and vulnerable populations-women of color and their
children.
As troubling as the effects of sanctioning practices are, the sanctions
raise other concerns. For example, a study conducted by Yeheskel
Hasenfeld found that approximately half of the sanctioned adults surveyed
did not know they had been sanctioned. 10 4 For these families, the welfare
system may seem so complex, arbitrary, and mystifying that they cannot
determine why their benefits are fluctuating. This suggests that rather than
creating a set of incentives that will "make work pay," the current welfare
system is simply punishing people who cannot figure out how the system
works. 105
PETERSON, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, REP. No. IWPR-E5 11, FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON TANF REAUTHORIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY ISSUES FOR THE
FUTURE OF WELFARE REFORM 4 (2002); ISABEL V. SAWHILL ET AL., BROOKINGS INST.,
WELFARE REFORM: AN OVERVIEW OF EFFECTS TO DATE (2001), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/01 poverty haskins.aspx; Pamela Holcomb &
Caroline Ratcliffe, When Welfare Recipients Fail to Comply with Work Requirements:
Indiana's Experience with Partial Benefit Sanctions, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. SCIENCES 1, 4
(2000).
A recent study of California's TANF system found one-fifth of the adults were being
sanctioned, and that the sanction rates doubled between 2000 and 2005. KLERMAN &
BURSTAIN, supra note 93, at xvii-xviii.
101 HEIDI GOLDBERG & Liz SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A
COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO SANCTIONS IN STATE AND COUNTY TANF PROGRAMS
(2000).
102 Schram, supra note 95, at 99 (finding that among various factors analyzed, "only race
and ethnic composition [of a state] affect the probability of adopting a family cap policy");
see also Joe Soss et al., The Hard Line and the Color Line: Race, Welfare, and the Roots of
Get-Tough Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 245 (Sanford F. Schram
et al. eds., 2003) (finding that "adoption of family caps and strict time limits was unrelated to
any factor other than the racial composition of the [welfare] rolls").
103 Ariel Kalil et al., Sanctions and Material Hardship Under TANF, 76 SOC. SERV. REV.
642, 655 (2002); see also PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 96, at 33-34 (finding African
Americans are sanctioned at higher rates than other racial and ethnic groups).
104 Yeheskel Hasenfeld et al., The Logic of Sanctioning Welfare Recipients: An Empirical
Assessment, 78 SoC. SERV. REV. 304, 314 (2004).
105 Sanctions are not only imposed for noncompliance with work requirements. States
can establish other grounds for sanctioning as well. For example, women receiving welfare
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III. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY TODAY
Welfare reform not only produced punitive policies, but also
established a system that blurred the boundaries between the welfare system
and the criminal justice system. Until the 1990s, the welfare system was
relatively simple and self-contained. The rules of AFDC and Food Stamps
were handed down by the federal government, and eligibility rules and
violations of welfare rules were consistent from state to state. If families
were found ineligible for aid, they were given notice and their benefits
ended. If they were found cheating-for example, underreporting their
income or failing to report a change of household composition-but were
still income-eligible for aid, then the penalties were civil: their welfare
benefits would typically be reduced by a certain percentage each month
until any overpayments were recouped by the state.
10 6
As a result of the reforms, the federal government and the states
instituted policies and practices that burdened welfare receipt with
criminality; policed the everyday lives of poor families; and wove the
criminal justice system into the welfare system, often entangling poor
families in the process. David Garland notes that the "themes that dominate
crime policy-rational choice and the structures of control, deterrents, and
disincentives, the normality of crime, the responsibilization of individuals,
the threatening underclass, the failing, overly lenient system-have come to
organize the politics of poverty as well." 10 7 The welfare reform policies
were designed to punish the poor; to stigmatize poverty, particularly
in California may be sanctioned for failing to cooperate in the State's efforts to establish a
child's paternity and to assign child support benefits to the State. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11477(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). Exceptions to this requirement apply when
establishing paternity poses risks of abuse to mother or child, or where a child was conceived
through rape or incest. This exception, however, may not come to light until a mother has
already refused to provide information and has been sanctioned.
Little to no qualitative research on the effects of sanctions on the daily lives of families
who are sanctioned has been conducted. One might suppose, though, that these get-tough
policies, intended to spur low-income women into the workforce, are making life more
difficult for families who are already struggling.
106 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(22) (1994) (repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C. (2006))) (requiring states to recoup
welfare overpayments, whether or not the overpayment was the fault of the state or the
individual welfare recipient).
107 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 196 (2001). Other scholars have begun
tracing the ways that crime-control strategies have seeped into various realms of social life.
John Gilliom, for example, traced the emergence of drug testing in the workplace and how it
involved a process of "reclassifying largely criminal policies as administrative and
colonizing the workplace as a site of surveillance and control." JOHN GILLIOM,
SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE LAW: EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING AND THE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL CONTROL 119 (1996).
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poverty that leads to welfare receipt; and to create a system of deterrence
aimed at the middle class.
A vast regulatory and punitive system developed under welfare
reform. The welfare policies the states instituted after welfare devolution
included a broad range of punitive approaches to the poor designed not only
to punish poor adults who failed to transition from welfare to work, but also
to punish entire families where the head of the household failed to live up to
governing standards of morality. 10 8  The reforms not only ended aid to
families as a federal entitlement, they allowed states to develop their own
rules about who was entitled to aid and their own regulations and practices
around removing families from the aid rolls. More importantly and less
well-known, however, the reforms of 1996 produced a system that blurred
the boundaries between the welfare system and the criminal justice system.
The welfare system is increasingly used by the government to police
crimes, both those involving welfare and those unrelated to welfare. As the
next Part illustrates, the welfare system is now being used to catch
criminals, and restrictions on aid are being used to punish individuals who
have been convicted of crimes.
108 The "family cap" policies-welfare rules prohibiting an increase in a poor family's
cash assistance when a new child is born into the family-highlight the ways welfare
regulations affect issues of personal and family autonomy. The family cap rules were
intended by lawmakers to influence women's, especially poor women-of-color's, decisions
about birth control, abortion, childbearing, and family formation. The policies punish not
only women who decide to bear children while on welfare, but also their entire families.
Federal welfare reform legislation gave states the option of instituting family cap policies
that prohibit welfare offices from offering cash assistance to children born to families
receiving welfare. JODIE LEVIN EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILDBEARING &
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERIES BRIEF No. 1, LIFTING THE LID OFF THE FAMILY CAP: STATES
REVISIT PROBLEMATIC POLICY FOR WELFARE MOTHERS 1 (2003) (describing the federal and
state policies). Twenty-one states have adopted the family cap; two others-Idaho and
Wisconsin-have instituted flat grants for families of any size. Schram, supra note 95, at
95. The effects of the family cap are significant. According to the U.S. General Accounting
Office, in an average month in the year 2000, approximately 108,000 families were receiving
less cash assistance than they would have received without the punitive family cap policies.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-924, WELFARE REFORM: MORE RESEARCH NEEDED
ON TANF FAMILY CAPS AND OTHER POLICIES FOR REDUCING OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS 2
(2001). The family cap rules may also be increasing the number of abortions among low-
income women of color. A study of women affected by New Jersey's family cap found that
the abortion rate rose among welfare recipients subject to the rule-but only among African-
American welfare recipients. Radha Jagannathan & Michael J. Camasso, Family Cap and
Nonmarital Fertility: The Racial Conditioning of Policy Effects, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 52,
62 (2003).
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A. THE WELFARE SYSTEM AS A TOOL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
The fugitive felon prohibitions, Operation Talon, and the drug felony
lifetime ban have little to do with aid to the poor. These rules and programs
are essentially new ways for the criminal justice system to make use of
welfare administrative data to capture poor individuals who are also wanted
by the criminal justice system. Through changes in statutes and practices,
then, the welfare system has become an extension of the criminal justice
system.
1. Fugitive Felon Prohibitions
The federal welfare legislation of 1996 included a provision that
prohibited any individual who is wanted by law enforcement officials for a
felony warrant or for violating the terms of parole or probation from
receiving government benefits, including not only TANF benefits, but also
food stamps, SSI, and housing assistance. 109 The fugitive felon provisions
allow the criminal justice system to side-step privacy protections that apply
to government and financial information belonging to citizens who are not
receiving welfare.
According to a 2002 report by the then-General Accounting Office
(GAO) (now the Government Accountability Office), "about 110,000
beneficiaries [were] identified as fugitive felons and dropped form the SSI,
Food Stamp, and TANF rolls."'' l While government officials claim that
fugitive felon rules remove dangerous criminals from the streets,1 1' it is not
clear that dangerous criminals are those who are ensnared by the effort.
According to the GAO report, more than one quarter of the SSI recipients
excluded from aid under the rule were dropped because of parole or
probation violations; in more than 37.4% of the cases, the offense on the
warrant was not indicated in the data. 1 2  Not all parole or probation
violations, however, are direct threats to public safety. An individual may
have a warrant issued for arrest for parole or probation offenses that, while
109 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, Title II, § 202, 110 Stat. 2105, 2185-86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1382 (2006)) (relating to SSI benefits); id. at Title VIII, § 821, 110 Stat. at 2321 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (2006)) (relating to food stamps); id. at Title IX, § 903, 110
Stat. at 2348-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)) (relating to public
housing).
110 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-716, WELFARE REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION
OF FUGITIVE FELON PROVISIONS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 3 (2002).
"1 Press Release, Nancy Bartel, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Operation Talon Sting Nabs
Hundreds of Fugitive Felons in Portland Area .(Feb. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/oig45.htm.
112 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 110, at 39.
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they may be violations of parole, are not criminal acts. For example, an
individual may have a warrant issued for missing a meeting with a parole or
probation officer, missing a substance abuse meeting, or being determined
to be psychologically unstable.
Thus, it is not clear whether this rule is reining in threatening criminals
and keeping public housing safe, or instead merely reducing the
government's costs for providing aid to individuals with outstanding
warrants. Excluding felons-even those who have served their sentences-
from the full benefits available to citizens without felony convictions
certainly draws upon precedents under some state laws. A number of states
exclude convicted felons, including those who have completed their
sentences, from voting. 1 3  However, the drug felony exclusion and the
fugitive felon rules extend beyond political disfranchisement to encompass
deprivations of economic citizenship. While withdrawing the right to vote
may have little impact on an individual's daily life, economic
disfranchisement can substantially and detrimentally affect not only daily
life, but also physical well-being.
In short, the fugitive felon provisions raise several concerns: first, the
denial of benefits to needy adults and their children; second, the suspension
of procedural rights within the welfare system for individuals who have
been involved in the criminal justice system; and third, the denial of
economic citizenship.
2. Operation Talon
The federal welfare legislation also loosened the confidentiality that
once protected poor families' personal and financial information 14 Before
1996, law enforcement officers could only access welfare records through
113 JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OuT: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74 (2006).
114 The use of Social Security numbers and privacy concerns over their use were a big
concern during the 1970s. See, e.g., Marjorie Hunter, Social Security Number at Birth
Urged to Curb Welfare Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1972, at 24 (discussing heated debates
over use of Social Security numbers in the welfare system). Many civil libertarians opposed
the requirement of Social Security numbers for welfare benefits and opposed exchanges of
information between government agencies. Id. In 1974 Congress passed the Privacy Act,
which stated that states and localities could not withhold benefits from individuals who
refused to provide Social Security numbers. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88
Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)). The following year, Congress
passed an amendment to the Act requiring disclosure of a Social Security number as a
condition of AFDC eligibility. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647,
88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). The next
year, Congress authorized states to use Social Security numbers as a requirement of
eligibility in any public assistance program. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
Title XII, § 1211, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 405 (2006)).
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legal process, but now welfare records are available to law enforcement
officers simply upon request-without probable cause, suspicion, or
judicial process of any kind.' 15  The scope of an individual's rights to
financial privacy under the U.S. Constitution is narrow,' 16 but California
protects individuals who are affluent enough to have bank accounts from
state actors conducting fishing expeditions in their financial records.'
17
Under the federal regulations, both welfare offices and public housing
agencies are required to "furnish any Federal, State, or local law
enforcement officer, upon the request of the officer, with the current
address, Social Security number, and photograph of any recipient of
assistance."'" 8 This exchange of information is not merely available to law
enforcement officials when the welfare recipient herself is suspected of
violating the law, but rather more generally when an officer believes the aid
recipient, or anyone in her household, "has information that is necessary for
the officer to conduct an official duty."'"19
The information exchange between welfare offices and law
enforcement, however, has expanded beyond mere investigatory use.
Under a program titled "Operation Talon," food stamp offices are used as
115 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, Title I, § 408(9)(B), 110 Stat. 2105, 2140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
608 (2006)) (legislating that prior state safeguards on disclosure of personal information
"shall not prevent the State agency administering the program from furnishing a Federal,
State, or local law enforcement officer, upon the request of the officer, with the current
address of any recipient if the officer furnishes the agency with the name of the recipient").
116 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that individuals have no legitimate expectation of
privacy to financial information they disclose to banks through the regular course of business
and therefore no Fourth Amendment claims when a bank is subpoenaed. United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976). A recent federal district court case, however, noted
that while searches conducted under legal process are protected, individuals have standing to
challenge searches of financial records as unlawful where the searches are conducted either
without legal process or outside the scope of a subpoena that has been issued. Walker v.
S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 491 F. Supp. 2d 781, 790 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
117 Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 595-95 (Cal. 1974) (holding that "bank
statements or copies thereof obtained by [investigators] without the benefit of legal process
were acquired as the result of an illegal search and seizure"). Congress has offered some
privacy protections to customers of banking institutions through the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title XI, 92 Stat. 3641, 3693 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2006)).
118 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(D) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1437z (2006).
119 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(D)(i)(II). Individuals who receive Social Security benefits
possess greater privacy rights over their information. Under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, an individual receiving Social Security benefits cannot be
subject to any adverse action as a result of data matching without both verification of the
information and prior notice to the individual. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,




the sites of sting operations for arresting individuals with outstanding
warrants. 12  People with warrants who receive food stamps typically
receive a call telling them to report to a welfare office at a designated time
to resolve a problem with their benefits or receive some kind of bonus.
121
When they show up, an officer from the sheriffs department is waiting to
do the arrest. Thousands of low-income citizens have been rounded up
under the program.
Operation Talon was a program developed under the Office of
Inspector General to expedite enforcement of the fugitive felon rule.
122
Then-Vice President Al Gore served as spokesperson for the program.
123
As a result of the 1996 federal rule changes, law enforcement officers now
actively use the food stamp records of local social service agencies to locate
and apprehend individuals with outstanding arrest warrants. 124 Operation
Talon transformed food stamp offices into the sites of sting operations for
arresting aid recipients with outstanding arrest warrants and facilitated use
of welfare administrative data to capture low-income individuals who are
wanted by the criminal justice system. Through this program the welfare
system has become an extension of the criminal justice system,
transforming the welfare system into a trap for hungry lawbreakers.
120 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF AGRIC., OPERATION TALON: OCTOBER 2000
UPDATE 6 (2000); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF AGRIC., OPERATION TALON (1998).
121 Food Stamp Bust Nets 205 Suspects, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 12, 2000, at B6 (describing a
sting where individuals were "[lured by promises of cash bonuses and transportation
reimbursement"); Kristan Trugman, Fake Gambling Trip Helps Cops Snare Maryland, D.C.
Fugitives, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at Cl (describing how, after food stamp recipients
with outstanding warrants were identified through computer checks, they "were encouraged
to sign up early for a free bus junket to Atlantic City for a day of gambling, offers of a $50
stake and a free gym bag").
122 The Inspector General for the Department of Agriculture stated Operation Talon was
initiated "to locate and apprehend fugitives who were illegally receiving food stamp benefits,
thereby ensuring that program benefits go to those who are truly in need." Review the
Operations of the Food Stamp Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Department
Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry of the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong.
20 (2003) (statement of Phyllis K. Kong, Inspector General, United States Department of
Agriculture).
123 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Gore Announces Arrest of 2,199 Fugitives in
Nationwide Sting (Dec. 18, 1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/12/
0447.
124 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, Title I, § 408(9)(B), 110 Stat. 2105, 2140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
608 (2006)) (legislating that prior state safeguards on disclosure of personal information
"shall not prevent the State agency administering the program from furnishing a Federal,
State, or local law enforcement officer, upon the request of the officer, with the current
address of any recipient if the officer furnishes the agency with the name of the recipient").
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Between early 1997 and September 2006, Operation Talon led to the
arrest of 10,980 individuals across the country. 125  While the Inspector
General's Year 2000 Update on Operation Talon indicates that some
individuals arrested under the program faced charges for violent or serious
crimes, many others did not. For example, 31% were for offenses known as
"Group B offenses," such as writing bad checks, which are considered less
serious. Many of the Group A arrests were for non-violent offenses: 11%
were for fraud charges and 10% were for larceny/theft offenses, categories
which may include welfare fraud; 23% were for drug-related crimes.
126
Various states seem to have targeted different types of felony offenders
under the program. For example, while two-thirds of the individuals caught
in the Illinois program instituted under Operation Talon had outstanding
warrants on drug-related charges, more than three-fourths of the California
offenders had fraud warrants (which include but are not limited to welfare
fraud charges). 127 Thus, it is not clear whether this program is protecting
public safety by reining in violent criminals or simply providing law
enforcement officers a new tool in carrying out arrests.
Government costs-and any cost savings-associated with
administering the program are unclear. In testimony before the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on the Budget, Inspector General Phyllis
Fong stated that: "It is difficult... for most States to determine costs
savings because even though fugitives are removed from the food stamp
eligibility roles, they may be only one member in an entire household that
continues to be eligible."' 128 Researchers have yet to explore the effects of
this program on the families who receive food stamps and other benefits.
The big value for the federal government and for localities seems to rest in
the numerous press releases celebrating the number of arrests made through
use of Operation Talon.
125 A Closer Look. Inspectors General Address Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Federal
Mandatory Programs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 108th Cong. 66, 1st
Session (2003) [hereinafter Hearing on Waste, Fraud, and Abuse] (statement of Phyllis K.
Fong, Inspector General., U.S. Department of Agriculture); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT No. 56, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: FY 2006--2ND HALF 22 (2006).
126 Formulation of the 2002 Farm Bill: Hearings Before the H. Comm. of Agriculture
and Its Subcomm., 107th Cong. 643-57 (2001) (statement of Roger C. Viadero, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Agriculture); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OPERATION
TALON: OCTOBER 2000 UPDATE, supra note 120, at 6.
127 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OPERATION TALON: OCTOBER 2000 UPDATE, supra
note 120, at 6.
128 Hearing on Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, supra note 125, at 66 (statement of Phyllis K.
Fong, Inspector Gen., U.S. Department of Agriculture).
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3. The Drug Felony Lifetime Ban
The federal welfare legislation encourages states to adopt rules
excluding adults with drug felony convictions from receiving aid. As of
December 2001, forty-two states had adopted the drug felony ban either in
part or in full. 129 By 2005, the number of states that adopted the drug felony
ban had dropped to thirty-two. 130 The states themselves chose the criteria
they use to determine whether an individual is ineligible for government aid
based on a past drug conviction. These criteria vary dramatically.
In fifteen states, all drug related charges-from possession of small
quantities to major trafficking-disqualify an individual from welfare
receipt for life. 131 Poor adults in these states may receive neither cash aid
nor food stamps. The other states that exclude convicted drug felons from
public assistance have modified their exclusions in various ways. For
example, some of the states disqualify individuals convicted of
manufacturing or distributing drugs, but allow those who have been
convicted of using drugs to remain on aid.132 Some states allow parents
who are participating in or who have completed drug treatment programs to
re-qualify for aid.1 33 In some states adults are ineligible for aid for the first
twelve months after incarceration, but are eligible thereafter. 34  Only
fifteen states bar those convicted of drug offenses from receiving food
stamps for life.
135
As well as anyone has been able to measure, approximately 92,000
adults had been removed from the welfare rolls because of their felony drug
convictions between 1997 and 2002.136 According to data analysis by
129 PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 1 (2002).
130 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS
FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF
SELECTED BENEFITS 17 (2005).
131 Id. at 33-34 tbl.5.
132 ALLARD, supra note 129, at 2.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130, at 20. Fourteen states exempt
all individuals convicted of drug felonies from food stamp bans, while twenty-one states
allow only some individuals with drug convictions to receive food stamps. Id. Food stamps
are federally funded, and the benefits flow not only to low-income individuals, but also to
the businesses that accept them and to local food producers. Food stamps are also viewed as
a benefit that cannot be easily used for illicit purposes, unlike cash benefits.
136 ALLARD, supra note 129, at 4. The Government Accountability Office points out that
measuring the full effect of the drug felony exclusion is virtually impossible, since states do
not report the number of parents they find ineligible for welfare due to drug convictions
because there is no way to accurately determine the number of individuals who might be
low-income heads of households and because there is no way to determine how this rule
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Patricia Allard at the Sentencing Project, California disqualified 37,825
adults from welfare receipt under the felony drug exclusion between 1996
and 1999.137 (Thus, as the numbers above show, California accounted for
more than one-third of the families excluded under the felony drug
exclusion nationwide.) California modified its food stamp ban in 2004,138
but maintained its ban on TANF benefits.
While California's TANF program was supposed to make substance
abuse treatment available to individuals who needed it in order to become
work-ready, it is unlikely that mothers with substance abuse problems who
know about the felony drug exclusion would reveal this to their
caseworkers given the penalties. Rather than deterring welfare recipients
from drug use, these rules-assuming they are known and understood by
welfare recipients-may have the counter-effect of discouraging mothers
with drug problems from inquiring about or seeking out help with their
problems.
It could be argued persuasively that the drug felony ban is unfair-that
it punishes not only parents, but also their children. 139 It is also a harsh
punishment for first-time petty drug offenders. 140  Furthermore, as others
have noted, it is arbitrary to target drug offenders when individuals
convicted of other crimes, such as homicide and rape, can receive benefits
after serving their sentences.141
Given the limited knowledge of the elements of welfare reform among
welfare recipients, 142 most recipients are likely unaware of the felony drug
exclusion. This lack of knowledge and the diversity of rules nationwide
make it difficult for the felony drug exclusion to serve as a clear,
unwavering deterrent to drug use. In some states the rules are so complex
that it is unlikely any welfare recipient knows or fully understands them
unless or until she finds herself subject to them.
The drug felony lifetime ban again makes the welfare system an
instrument of the criminal justice system. Here, again, the policies push
affects household composition. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 130,
app.II.
137 ALLARD, supra note 129, at 5.
138 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18901.3 (West Supp. 2009).
139 Peter Schrag, Op-Ed., Food Stamps Become a Weapon in the War on Drugs, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, June 3, 2001, at 03.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See generally Kaaryn Solveig Gustafson, The Morality and Rationality of Welfare




those who are already economically marginalized to the periphery of
society.
B. CONFLATING POVERTY AND CRIME
1. Biometric Imaging and Data Sharing Between the Welfare and Criminal
Justice Systems
To prevent fraud, welfare administrators collect vast amounts of
information about welfare recipients and their families. 143 Those who want
to receive welfare have to fill out extensive paperwork at the time of their
initial application and again every twelve months for their annual renewal
of aid. In addition, they have to submit monthly and quarterly forms
describing any changes in their income or household circumstances.
Problems with paperwork routinely tie up assistance payments for
recipients. 144
In the late 1990s some federal studies began to examine welfare
cheating and welfare overpayments. Studies found that there were some
individuals receiving food stamp benefits in more than one state and that it
was possible some individuals might be collecting cash aid in multiple
states. 145 There were also reports that government benefits were flowing to
men and women who were incarcerated. 1
46
14' 45 C.F.R. § 205.51 (2008) (recording federal regulation requiring states to collect
particular types of personal information and to establish an electronic Income Eligibility and
Verification System).
1" Of the 24,970 welfare grants discontinued in December 2008 to one- and two-parent
households, 10,898 (or 45%) were discontinued because the recipients failed to complete or
return paperwork (known as CW7 and QR 7 forms). CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., CALIFORNIA
WORK OPPORTUNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO KIDS (CALWORKs) REPORT ON REASONS FOR
DISCONTINUANCES OF CASH GRANT 1 (2009), available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/
research/res/pdf/CA%20253/2008/CA253DecO8.pdf (calculations drawn from columns A
and C).
" See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-228, FOOD STAMP
OVERPAYMENTS: HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT STATES COLLECT BENEFITS FOR THE SAME
INDIVIDUALS (1998) (studying duplicate food stamp participation data across states and
finding potentially 20,000 duplicate Social Security numbers); OFFICE OF STATE SYSTEMS,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., REPORT To CONGRESS ON DATA PROCESSING AND CASE
TRACKING IN THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) PROGRAM (1997)
(reporting that no federal agency tracks duplicate TANF cases across state lines).
146 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-54, FOOD STAMPS: SUBSTANTIAL
OVERPAYMENTS RESULT FROM PRISONERS COUNTED AS HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS (1997)
(finding that government agencies, inadequately verifying household composition, were
issuing benefits to incarcerated individuals, and recommending computer cross-checks
between welfare agencies and the criminal justice system); see also Josh Meyer, Prisoners
Get Food Stamps, U.S. Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at Bl.
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The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation required states to institute
fraud prevention programs. 147 The legislation did not, however, specify
what the fraud prevention programs should look like. The three most
populous states-California, New York, and Texas-as well as some other
states instituted biometric imaging, in most cases fingerprint imaging
programs, as part of their welfare fraud control measures. These biometric
data collection requirements have been applied, depending on the state, to
recipients of food stamps, TANF grants, and General Assistance grants
(available to indigent adults without children). Individuals who apply for
cash aid or food stamps in these states are required to submit fingerprints-
and sometimes photographs-through an electronic imaging system. New
fingerprints are cross-checked with those on record to identify cases where
a person might have tried to apply for aid in two different welfare offices.
The stated goals of these programs are to deter and catch individuals who
might attempt to "double-dip" by using aliases to open welfare cases.
Table 1












1. Information gathered from WILLIAM S. BORDEN & ROBBI L. RUBEN-URM, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., REPORT No. FSP-02-CM, AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPUTER MATCHING IN THE
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: VOLUME 1-SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS (2002). University
of Connecticut Law Professor Todd Fernow pointed out to me the irony of Connecticut's
finger printing program for welfare recipients, where state statute recognizes criminal
mugshots and fingerprinting to be invasions of privacy and provides individuals a right to
have records erased from criminal justice system databases when individuals are found
not guilty or where the cases are dismissed, whether outright or through nolle prosequi.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
147 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(6) (2006).
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While there were several well-publicized California and Illinois cases
of double-dipping welfare fraud between 1975 and 1983, discussed in Part
II, infra, in all of those cases the welfare recipients had first signed up for
aid before applicants were required to submit Social Security numbers and
before extensive computer verification systems existed. With
computerization in place, individuals would have great difficulty opening
multiple cases: even if they used fake Social Security numbers, computer
checks on the numbers would be likely to reveal earnings or assets
associated with those numbers. The fingerprint imaging systems, then, are
largely superfluous to existing efforts to reduce fraud. 148 But fingerprint
imaging serves another purpose: the collection of biometric data scrutinizes
and stigmatizes low-income adults in a way that equates poverty with
criminality.
In states with biometric imaging, applying for welfare mirrors the
experience of being booked for a crime: after being interrogated about
family and finances, individuals are photographed and fingerprinted. The
fingerprint images are entered into statewide computer systems and then
used to check for duplicate applications. Few duplicates-indicating one
person submitting more than one welfare application-are found. In
California, for example, the state identifies only three matches per month
and typically refers only one of these cases per month for more extensive
fraud investigation or prosecution. 149  A report by the California State
Auditor in 2003 berated the Legislature for the fingerprint imaging system,
stating it was impossible "to determine whether SFIS [State Fingerprint
Imaging System] generates enough savings to cover the estimated $31
million the State has paid for SFIS or the estimated $11.4 million the State
will pay each year to operate it.
' 150
Policymakers claim that the real motive behind fingerprint imaging is
deterring, not merely catching, acts of fraud. There is, however, evidence
that procedures deter not only fraudulent applications, but also legitimate
148 Even before California instituted the first fingerprint imaging program, legislative
analysts and state consultants noted that adequate fraud control measures were in place and
that fingerprint imaging would be unlikely to identify a significant number of fraud cases.
Rivera, supra note 77.
149 CAL. STATE AUDITOR, BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS, REPORT No. 2001-015, STATEWIDE
FINGERPRINT IMAGING SYSTEM (2003).
15o Id. at iii. The report added:
The Legislature should consider the pros and cons of repealing state law requiring fingerprint
imaging, including whether SFIS is consistent with the State's community outreach and
education campaign efforts for the Food Stamp program. To assist the Legislature in its
consideration of the pros and cons of repealing state law requiring fingerprint imaging, Social
Services and the data center should report on the full costs associated with discontinuing SFIS.
Id. at 8.
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applications by needy families, particularly eligible immigrant families. 5'
The fingerprint imaging requirements create another hurdle that poor adults
must clear in what is an otherwise demanding application process. In some
counties in California, fingerprint imaging is done only on certain days,
sometimes requiring aid applicants to make an additional trip to the welfare
department and delaying the time between initial application and first day
of aid receipt. 5 2 Individuals who apply for welfare but who choose not to
follow through with the applications by providing their finger images may
do so as an act of resistance to government authority, but may unwittingly
be opening themselves up to additional government scrutiny.
153
While lawmakers and the public seem unwilling to devote tax dollars
to providing cash benefits to the poor, there seems to be great willingness to
spend money to police the poor-even when doing so appears economically
inefficient or ineffective. Separate audits of the fingerprint imaging
systems in New York, 154 Texas, 155 and California 156 determined that the
151 SERVS., IMMIGRANT RIGHTS & EDUC. NETWORK, IMMIGRANT FAMILY ACCESS TO FOOD
STAMPS IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY (2000). The Asian Pacific American Legal Center
(APALC) conducted a survey of community-based organizations to determine why, despite
such high poverty rates among Asian and Pacific Islander communities, food stamps were
being underutilized by eligible members of those communities. The report listed fear of the
state fingerprint imaging system as one of the top four barriers to food stamp use among the
eligible poor. ASIAN PACIFIC AM. LEGAL CTR., BARRIERS TO FOOD STAMPS (2000).
152 Several years ago, while recruiting interviewees outside a Northern California welfare
office for a research project, I routinely met welfare applicants who were showing up for
their second or third fingerprint imaging appointments because the machine had been broken
on previous visits to the welfare office.
153 A California welfare applicant challenged the state's fingerprinting requirement after
she refused to be fingerprinted and her entire household was subsequently denied welfare
benefits. Sheyko v. Saenz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The plaintiff argued
that being fingerprinted and photographed was "an invasion of privacy and personal dignity"
and that fingerprinting was a violation of her religious freedom because the imaging left "a
mark of the devil and stains the soul with sin." Id. at 688. The claimant also argued that
fingerprinting deterred needy families from aid and resulted in a net loss of tax dollars. The
California appellate court that heard the case, however, noted that the U.S. Department of
Agriculture produced a document stating that fingerprint imaging might prevent fraud and
that the judiciary was "not in the best position to craft efficient relief laws." Id. at 688. The
appellate court upheld the lower court's decision that welfare applicants could be deemed
ineligible for aid for failure to be fingerprinted and photographed. Id. at 701.
154 Hearing on SB 1, General Appropriations Act for 2008-09 Before the H.
Appropriations Subcomm. on Health and Human Serv., 80th Leg. (Tex. 2007) [hereinafter
Tex. Hearing] (statement of Celia Hagert, Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Public Policy
Priorities).
155 Id.; DEANNA T. SCHEXNAYDER ET AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RES., LONE
STAR IMAGE SYSTEM EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT (1997). Texas began fingerprint imaging
on a pilot basis in 1996 and implemented statewide in August 1999. Tex. Hearing, supra
note 154 (statement of Celia Hagert, Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Public Policy
Priorities). By the end of 2000, fingerprint imaging had cost the state $15.9 million dollars.
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systems were costly, caught few (if any) cheats, and served as both a hurdle
and a deterrent to poor families in need of aid. In each case, less than one-
half of 1% of the new and recertified cases triggered a match-0.44% in
Texas. 157  By instituting these programs, states signaled that crime
control-specifically preventing the receipt of excess government
benefits-takes priority over relieving poverty, relieving food insecurity,
and containing state administrative costs.
The fingerprinting programs, which contribute to the stigma of
receiving government aid, may also deter needy families from applying. 158
It is generally true that only a fraction of those families eligible for food
stamps receive them. 59 Still, most of the states with fingerprint imaging
requirements in 2006 had fewer eligible families receiving food stamps than
the national average. 160  Nationwide, in 2006, 67% of those individuals
eligible for food stamps participated in the food stamp program. 161 The
only states that employed fingerprint imaging and had a higher-than-
average food stamp participation rate were Illinois, with a participation rate
of 79%, and Pennsylvania, with a participation rate of 75%. The other five
states that that required fingerprinting for food stamp participation had
participation rates between 50% (in California) and 65% (Connecticut).1
62
As the following Part illustrates, fingerprinting is by no means the
most invasive proposal for regulating welfare recipients.
2. Drug Testing
The welfare system is moving beyond efforts to punish drug use when
it comes to the attention of law enforcement officers. Some states are
becoming invasive in their search for drug-use among the welfare poor, and
Id. While the Texas Department of Human Services claimed that fingerprint imaging was
cost-effective, that claim was based on the decline in food stamp cases. Id. Between 1996
and the end of 2000, fingerprint imaging had "resulted in only nine charges filed by the DA,
10 administrative penalty cases, and 12 determinations of no fraud." Id.
156 CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 149.
157 Tex. Hearing, supra note 154 (statement of Celia Hagert, Senior Policy Analyst,
Center for Public Policy Priorities).
158 SUSAN BARTLETT ET AL., FOOD ASSISTANCE & NUTRITION RESEARCH PROGRAM,
REPORT No. E-FAN-03-013-3, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM ACCESS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 8-10
(2004) (finding applicants who applied for benefits in offices that required fingerprinting
were 23% less likely to complete the application process than those who went to offices that
did not require fingerprinting).
159 KAREN E. CUNNYNGHAM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., REACHING
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penalties against drug-users do not apply only to those actually convicted of
drug-related offenses. Michigan, for example, instituted "a pilot program of
substance abuse testing as a condition for family independence assistance
eligibility in at least [three] counties, including random substance abuse
testing."' 163 Under the plan, all adults who applied for welfare were to be
tested as part of the application process. In addition, every six months 20%
of the recipients would be randomly tested. According to the Family
Independence Program's Eligibility Manual:
[A]pplicants who refuse to take the drug test without good cause and applicants
who fail to complete the assessment process or do not comply with a required
treatment plan within two months will be refused benefits. Aid recipients who refuse
to submit to the random drug testing will lose a percentage of their benefits each
month; after four months of failure to cooperate in the testing, such recipients will
have all benefits withheld. 164
The drug testing pilot program was challenged even before it was
implemented. A federal district court in Michigan preliminarily enjoined
implementation of the pilot program in 1999 as constituting an illegal
search, a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, because the testing was
done even where there was no "particularized suspicion" of illicit
behavior. 165 Between 1999 and 2002, however, the Supreme Court issued a
ruling allowing suspicionless drug testing in public schools and broadening
the category of "special needs" that might justify suspicionless searches.
166
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit lifted the district court's injunction, allowing
Michigan to proceed with its drug testing program. 167 The Sixth Circuit
extended the definition of a "special need" justifying suspicionless searches
by grouping a number of social concerns into a special need among welfare
recipients.168  These concerns included "the safety of the children of
families" receiving aid, "the risk to the public from the crime associated
with illicit drug use and trafficking," and the need to insure that cash is
"used by the recipients for their intended purposes and not for procuring
controlled substances."'169 The Sixth Circuit decision declared that the drug
testing did not intrude into welfare recipients' privacy interests because "it
is clear that the plaintiffs have a somewhat diminished expectation of
163 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.571(2) (West 2008).
164 Id.
165 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
166 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (allowing suspicionless drug testing of
high school students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities).
167 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002).
161 Id. at 335-36.
169 Id. at 336.
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privacy .... [W]elfare assistance is a very heavily regulated area of public
life with a correspondingly diminished expectation of privacy."
170
Indeed, welfare recipients have had very little privacy under U.S.
welfare policies. Still, using these past government refusals to recognize
the privacy rights of welfare recipients as justifications for further invasions
placed the argument on a shaky legal foundation. The Sixth Circuit opinion
stood in stark contrast to the welfare rights cases from the early 1970s,
which suggested that the poor do not lose their fundamental rights even
when their "brutal need" leads them to seek government aid.1 71 Judge
Batchelder's majority opinion in Marchwinski made clear that the
government's desire to "get tough on drugs" outweighs both the needs of
the poor, who will be dissuaded from seeking aid merely by the humiliation
of the experience, and their privacy rights, as they lack the full rights-
protections of other citizens.
When the Marchwinski case was reheard en banc, the panel of the
Sixth Circuit Court judges evenly split on the decision.1 2 By default, the
original injunction granted by the federal district court was reinstated.
Michigan's drug testing program was enjoined. I7 3 The possibility exists,
however, that other states may attempt to develop such programs.
The drug testing of welfare recipients particularly highlights the
conflation of poverty and crime and the widespread assumption that poor
women of color are the causes of crime. There is some dispute as to
whether welfare recipients have higher drug use and dependence than the
population at large.17 4 Drug use among welfare recipients appears to be
higher than drug use in the general population, but drug dependence, which
70 Id. at 337.
171 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (upholding procedural due process
rights for welfare recipients); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (upholding the
right of welfare recipients to travel).
172 Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 Fed. App'x. 601 (6th Cir. 2003). While no state
currently has a program of random testing for all welfare recipients, in the years since the
welfare reforms of 1996, eleven states other than Michigan-Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Oregon-have at some point proposed legislation or instituted drug testing programs for
some welfare recipients who have been identified as being at risk for drug abuse. ACLU,
WELFARE DRUG TESTING (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/drugpolicy/testing/
10757res20030415.html. Since the Marchwinski case was decided, there have been
intermittent discussions of attempting to try a modified version of the drug testing program
in Michigan. Drugs Redux, LANSING STATE J., Sept. 20, 2006, at 6A (describing drug-testing
bills unsuccessfully introduced in the Michigan legislature in 2004 and 2006).
173 Marchwinski, 60 Fed. App'x at 601.
174 Harold A. Pollack et al., Substance Use Among Welfare Recipients: Trends and
Policy Responses, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 256, 259 (2002).
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interferes with relationships and work, may not be higher.1 75 Further, even
if some welfare recipients use drugs, statistics indicate that the vast majority
of those who might be subjected to drug testing do not. 1
76
C. WELFARE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS
Unlike sanctions and family cap rules, which are policed by welfare
administrators, welfare fraud prosecutions rest mainly within the domain of
the criminal justice system. For this reason, welfare fraud policies stand
apart.
Poor families usually turn to the welfare system only when they are in
desperate need and cannot find employment to provide their most basic
needs. However, the cash benefits available under TANF are too low to
sustain a family. The gap between resources and need often leads welfare
recipients to seek income to supplement their welfare benefits and to hide
that income from the welfare office. In all states, a family who receives
TANF and food stamps as its only source of income will find itself living
well below the poverty threshold. In California, the maximum aid payment
available to a family of three living in a high-cost county is $723 in TANF
cash assistance and $361 in food stamps, for a total of $1,084.177 These
amounts would place the family at only 73% of the poverty threshold.
178
Because welfare recipients are required to work, many combine earnings
and welfare benefits. In November 2007, the average TANF cash aid grant
to California families was $528 and the average food stamp amount
$126.179 When it comes to violating the welfare rules, most welfare
recipients are damned if they do and doomed if they don't. In short, the
U.S. system both produces and punishes lawbreakers.
As several studies have found, families relying on the welfare system
cannot live on their cash aid alone. Because welfare benefits are so low,
most welfare recipients have to rely on other sources of income to make
171 Id. at 268-69.
176 RUKMALIE JAYAKODY ET AL., NAT'L POVERTY CTR., POLICY BRIEF No. 2, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AND WELFARE REFORM 3 (2004) ("[Flindings suggest that policymakers and
advocates have likely overstated the extent to which substance abuse contributes to
continuing dependence on cash aid.").
177 This is for fiscal year 2007-2008. For low-cost counties the figures are $689 in
TANF cash assistance and $377 in food stamps, for a total of $1,066. LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE 2008-09 BUDGET BILL: HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
I fig. 1 (2009), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis-2008/healthss/
hssan108009.aspx.
178 Id.
179 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FACTS AND FIGURES: FOR THE MONTH




ends meet. 180  As a result, almost all recipients engage in some kind of
income-generating activity that they hide from the welfare office, and that
could therefore be deemed fraud. This difficulty-perhaps impossibility-
of living on welfare grants alone means that for many families receiving
government assistance, their everyday activities of making ends meet
amount to crime.
California county welfare agencies are given the duties of identifying
and reclaiming overpayments from recipients, whether those overpayments
are due to recipient error or office error. The federal regulations require
welfare offices to notify clients within forty-five days of becoming aware of
a likely overpayment,181 though this notice rule has regularly been violated
by the counties. An overpayment to a family still on aid results in a 10%
reduction of the family's future grants until the overpayment is reclaimed
by the county. 18 2 The counties pursue cash repayments from individuals
who are no longer receiving aid. When those repayments are not
forthcoming, the counties may pursue a collections process, sometimes
leading to wage garnishment for newly-employed former welfare recipients.
Welfare cheating typically takes one of several forms.1 83 The first
involves working at a legitimate job, but failing to report all of the earnings
to the welfare office. The second type involves "side jobs": under-the-table
employment for cash that is not reported either to the welfare office or to
tax authorities. A third type of fraud occurs when welfare recipients fail to
report to welfare officials the presence of wage-earners in their household.
Other fraudulent activities may include receiving aid for a child no longer in
the household or, in rare cases, establishing false identities to collect aid for
non-existent persons.
1. Welfare Fraud Investigations
Welfare agencies aggressively investigate fraud before and after
applicants receive benefits. Alameda County, like other California
counties, conducts what is known as Early Fraud Prevention (EFP) by
180 EDIN & LEIN, supra note 38, at 7 ("Because of their constant budget shortfall,
mothers.., had to generate additional revenue to make ends meet. Welfare-reliant mothers
had to keep these activities hidden from their welfare caseworkers and other government
bureaucrats."); KAREN SECCOMBE, "So You THINK I DRIVE A CADILLAC?": WELFARE
RECIPIENTS' PERSPECTIVES ON THE WELFARE SYSTEM AND ITS REFORM 146 (1999) (reporting
that welfare recipients, unable to survive on welfare benefits, often turn to the help of
friends, neighbors, relatives, charities, and social service agencies).
"' 45 C.F.R. § 205.56(a)(1)(iv) (2008).
182 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11004 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
183 Welfare fraud prosecutions are typically brought under a state's general fraud statute.
Thus, statistics on felony arrests and prosecutions cannot disaggregate welfare fraud charges
from other types of fraud charges.
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screening welfare applicants for possible fraud before a case is even opened
and a check issued. Alameda County, however, engages in fewer EFP
measures than some other California Counties. Orange County California,
for example, has aggressively investigated applicants through EFP policies
since the early 1980s. The county's fraud prevention efforts set the
standard for the rest of the country. In fiscal year 1992-1993, 21% of the
applicants for AFDC and food stamps in Orange County were referred for
fraud investigation.
184
Welfare fraud investigations occurring after a case is open can be
triggered in one of several ways. First, an investigation may be triggered
when a data exchange based on a recipient's Social Security number
identifies an inconsistency in information. Second, an investigation may be
initiated by a welfare caseworker who suspects a problem. Third, an
investigation may be triggered by an anonymous call to one of the state or
county welfare fraud hotline numbers, or by any other form of tip provided
to the welfare office. Most investigations in California are triggered by
either a flag in the quarterly income verification done through the income
eligibility database or by tips to the state or local welfare fraud hotlines.
Welfare fraud investigations are commonplace. California
investigated 2.44% of its TANF aid caseload each month between October
and December 2007, though in some counties the rates of investigation
were much higher. 185 Investigations may delve deeply into the lives of
welfare recipients. While overstepping the welfare rules is a common
practice among welfare recipients, welfare fraud investigators cast their nets
broadly, routinely investigating welfare recipients who are not determined
to be engaged in fraud. A 1999 Los Angeles Grand Jury Report found that
"the statewide rate for the number of completed investigations with
allegations unfounded or insufficient evidence was 52.3[%].y186 A 2003
Los Angeles audit found only 34% of statewide fraud investigations and
30% of Los Angeles fraud investigations produced evidence of fraud.' 87
184 C.A. MACDONALD & Assoc., EARLY DETECTION AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS: STATE
DIRECTORY 9 (1995), available at http://www.camacdonald.com/edpstate.htm.
185 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., FRAUD INVESTIGATION REPORT: OCTOBER-DECEMBER
2007 (2007), available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/research/res/pdf/fraud/2007/Oct-
Dec07.pdf. Madera County, for example, had a caseload of 2,708 families and referred
1,060 cases (or 39% of its caseload) for fraud investigations. Id. at 5 tbl. 1.
186 L.A. GRAND JURY, WELFARE FRAUD PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES 4 (1999), available at
http://grandjury.co.1a.ca.us/gjury99/REPORtgj- 15.htm.
187 COUNTY OF L.A. DEP'T OF AUDITOR-CONTROLLER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL




California averaged just under 464,000 families receiving aid in the
last quarter of 2007 and had a severe backlog of pending welfare fraud
investigations-more than 52,000 as of the same quarter.188 The delay in
investigating cases means that overpayments to welfare recipients may
continue and accumulate during the interim period between the county or
state's first identification of problems with the case and the point at which
the client is notified of a problem.189 As a result, most of the overpayments
188 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., supra note 185, at 2, 5.
189 An example of the injustice of these delays can be found in a recent unpublished case,
People v. Pahoua Lo, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9428. In 1992, eighteen-year-old
Pahoua Lo, whose primary language was Hmong, applied for cash welfare benefits and food
stamps when she became pregnant. Id. at *3-4. In August of 1998, Lo informed both her
social services case worker and her Welfare to Work case worker that she would begin
working part-time as an interpreter for the local school district. She began work in
September and received her first paycheck on October 1, 1998. Id. at *4. She received her
pay for a given month on the first day of the following month and reported her earnings,
submitting her first-of-the-month earnings as pay for the earlier month, an error under the
California reporting rules. Id. at *5. Lo failed to report her income in November and
December and, when contacted by a case worker, explained that she was unaware she
needed to submit documentation each month since her pay was consistent from month to
month. Id. at *6. Though numerous database alerts between November 1998 and December
2001 signaled income reporting discrepancies to case workers, no case workers notified Lo
of problems with her case record, and her cash benefits and food stamps continued. Id. Lo
continued to receive cash payments through October 2001 and food stamps through July
2002. Id. at *2. Not until August 2002 did the welfare department inform Lo that she had
been overpaid benefits. Id. An administrative hearing determined that the overpayment was
caused not by intentional misrepresentations by Lo, but rather by the County Welfare
Department's administrative error. Id. at *8. At the same time, the hearing officer rejected
an argument of equitable estoppel and ordered Lo to repay approximately $30,000 in
benefits, finding that Lo had "unclean hands" because she had failed to accurately report
income (despite language barriers and explanations to case workers) and because "public
policy strongly demands repayment." Id. at *7-8.
In May 2004, the State brought criminal charges of welfare fraud and perjury against Lo.
Id. at *8. In November 2004, Lo pleaded no contest to felony welfare fraud; the perjury
charge was dismissed. Id. She was given probation, but found obligated to pay restitution
for the welfare overpayment of $30,000. Id. In 2006 the Superior Court issued a writ of
administrative mandamus related to the overpayment of cash aid and overissuance of food
stamps, wherein it attacked the County Welfare Department (CWD), declaring that "in
violation of its obligations to assist [defendant] and act humanely, if not in bad faith, the
CWD chose to pursue fraud instead of explaining to [defendant] how to report [her income
properly]." Id. at *9.
Granting equitable estoppel on the overpayment of cash benefits, the Superior Court
reduced the restitution amount to just over $15,000 in food stamp overissuances. Id. at * 12.
The Appellate Court affirmed that the food stamp overissuance was an administrative error,
which allows the State and the defendant to compromise on a settlement amount and, if Lo
returns to the food stamp program, limit collection efforts to thirty-six months. Id. at * 15
(citing Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment After Remand from the
Court of Appeal, Lomeli v. Saenz, No. 98CS0 1747 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 2000)).
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attributable to client failure to report income easily trigger felony fraud
charges since the accumulated overpayments usually surpass the dollar
threshold for a felony, versus misdemeanor, charge.
The line between administrative and criminal penalties for welfare
cheating has become increasingly blurry. Federal welfare legislation (the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of
1996, hereinafter PRWORA) greatly increased administrative penalties.
PRWORA states that if an individual loses benefits in any federally funded,
means-tested program due to fraud, she or he will not only lose benefits
under that program, but also become ineligible for increased benefits under
any other program. 190 In other words, if a welfare recipient is found to be
engaged in cash aid fraud by virtue of failing to report all of her income, she
will lose cash aid, and her household will see no increase in food stamps or
housing assistance to offset the decrease in aid.
As states implemented rules under federal welfare reform, many
stiffened their own civil and criminal penalties for government aid
recipients who cheat. California, for example, adopted a "three strikes and
you're out" rule for intentional program violations determined by the
administrative agency.' 91 In addition to civil penalties, California imposes
stiff criminal penalties for welfare fraud, including permanent exclusion
from aid. This comes on top of any penalties that the criminal justice
system might impose for a conviction of fraud or perjury. Welfare fraud
Pahoua Lo's case is not an isolated one. In 2002, a non-profit organization, People
United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO) filed suit on behalf of low-income families, claiming
that the County Welfare Department was failing to notify individuals of overpayments in a
timely manner and was instead allowing overpayments to accrue, sometimes for many years,
and then seeking repayment from poor families who lacked the memory and paperwork to
defend restitution claims. Complaint, PUEBLO v. Saenz, (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2002) (on
file with author). The action was dismissed for lack of standing.
190 42 U.S.C. § 608a(a) (2006).
191 The penalties for failing to report required information-even where the reporting
failures would not affect aid calculations-are tough. A finding of one offense, in an
administrative hearing or by a court, disqualifies an individual from aid for six months. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11486(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). A second
occasion results in a twelve-month disqualification from aid, and a finding of a third
occasion results in permanent-meaning life-long--disqualification from aid. Id. There are
other civil violations that can lead to permanent disqualification from welfare. Under
California law, an individual can be excluded from receiving welfare benefits for life for any
of the following violations: (1) "double dipping," or in other words, making false statements
or representations about one's place of residence in order to make simultaneous claims for
aid in more than one county or state; (2) submitting documents to receive aid for non-
existent children or for children ineligible for aid; or (3) receiving more than $10,000 in aid
as a result of intentionally and willfully making false statements or misrepresenting,




charges are available to prosecutors when welfare recipients receive
undeserved benefits as a result of making any kind of intentional
misstatement. 92
The legislative drive to punish welfare cheaters has created some
problems. In many California counties the physical boundaries between
welfare administration and criminal fraud control efforts have disappeared.
Of California's fifty-eight counties, only twenty-eight have the county
welfare departments conduct welfare fraud investigations. 193 The remaining
counties have moved their fraud investigators to law enforcement, with
twenty-one counties housing their fraud investigation units in the offices of
the District Attorney (DA), nine situating satellite DA's offices in the
welfare office, and two placing fraud investigations in the hands of local
sheriff s offices.194
The close relationship between officials who administer aid and those
who police cheating raises some troubling issues. Welfare recipients
identified as having received overpayments as a result of their failing to
report earnings are notified by letter that they must attend a meeting with an
official, and many of these officials share office space with case workers.
Although these officials are criminal fraud investigators or members of the
County DA's office, many welfare recipients do not realize that these
officials are part of the criminal justice system rather than the welfare
system. 195  As a result, they attend the meetings without consulting or
bringing legal counsel.
California welfare recipients suspected of fraud and called into
meetings with fraud investigators are asked to sign disqualification consent
agreements. These agreements are basically admissions that the recipients
192 Anyone convicted in state or federal court of felony welfare fraud is ineligible for aid
for two years if the amount of money in dispute is less than $2,000. Id. § 11486(b)(1). A
person convicted of fraudulently receiving between $2,000 and $10,000 is barred from
receiving aid for five years; a person convicted of fraudulently receiving more than $10,000
is prohibited from receiving aid for life. Id. § 11486(b)(2)-(b)(3).
193 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., supra note 185, at 4.
194 Id. Los Angeles turned its investigations over to the DA's office in January 1997.
Greg Krikorian, 8 Arrested in Probe of Welfare Fraud, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1997, at B 1.
195 My interviews with welfare recipients as part of my dissertation research indicated
that a number of welfare recipients who had been called in by the fraud investigation unit did
not know that these were criminal investigations. One interviewee, Yvonne, said that when
she received a letter stating that officials wanted to ask her some questions, she did not
understand the officials with whom she met were criminal investigators rather than welfare
officials. Gustafson, supra note 142, at 290. Even after a year of repayment through a
diversion program, she did not understand that she had been criminally sanctioned, that she
was no longer eligible for cash payments (although her children were), and that her
ineligibility was due to her failure to report income and not because she quit a job. Id. at
291.
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did not state all necessary facts in their monthly reporting forms or in their
(re)applications for aid. By signing one of these agreements, a welfare
recipient waives any available administrative remedies. 196 Before asking an
individual to sign a disqualification consent agreement, counties are
required to give the individual a notice including the following statements:
(1) [T]he accused understands the consequences of signing the consent agreement; (2)
consenting to the disqualification will result in a reduction in benefits for the
disqualification period; (3) the actual disqualification penalty to be imposed; and (4)
any remaining members of the [family] may be held liable for any overpayments that
the accused has not already repaid.
19 7
The procedures do not specify how far in advance the recipient must be
given this notice, so it is conceivable that the individual receives notice only
minutes before signing what amounts to an admission of criminally
culpable behavior.
Other research suggests that welfare fraud suspects sign these
agreements believing that they will be asked to repay money to the welfare
office, but are unaware that the consent agreements may be, and often are,
used as the basis for felony criminal charges brought against them later.' 98
In other words, they sign the agreements with far less than complete
knowledge of the consequences of doing so. Welfare recipients continue to
treat the welfare and criminal justice systems as distinct, unaware that the
two are merging.
The welfare reforms expressed a popular notion, namely, that
individuals who fail in the free market economy and turn to government
assistance programs lose the full benefits of citizenship. They become the
objects of unrelenting social control. At the same time, their everyday
activities and omissions-taking "side jobs" to supplement their income,
allowing boyfriends to move into the household, and failing to report all of
their earnings to the welfare office in writing-become subject to
punishment under criminal law.
2. Criminal Prosecutions
Failing to report all sources of income and support to the welfare
office can result in criminal charges. District Attorneys may bring charges
of welfare fraud and even perjury against welfare recipients who earn
196 CALIF. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 20-352.2
(1999).
117 Id. § 20-352-21.
198 Gustafson, supra note 142, at 291.
2009]
KAARYN GUSTAFSON
income through work but do not accurately report all of their income or
their household composition on their monthly reporting forms. 99
There is a demographic arbitrariness to welfare fraud prosecutions,
with some locales (and states) investigating more rigorously than others,
and with some locales prosecuting at higher rates than others. 200 Five of the
six largest counties in California have welfare caseloads of comparable size
and are presented for comparison in Table 2, infra. (Los Angeles County,
which is much larger, is excluded from the table.) The table demonstrates
that investigation and prosecution rates vary dramatically. Prosecutions
generally require the collaboration of welfare officials and local
prosecutors, meaning that much of the politics around welfare fraud is local.
Moreover, some states have made efforts to create general policies or
centralize control over welfare fraud investigations and prosecutions, while
others have left the decisions to localities. As a result, an individual welfare
recipient's chances of being investigated and prosecuted for welfare fraud
depend largely on where she lives.
Table 2
Comparison of Selected California Counties-Welfare Caseloads, Fraud
Investigations, Evidence of Fraud, Prosecutions Filed, Overpayments Collected1
County CalWORKs Number of Evidence to Prosec- Over-
caseload fraud support utions payments
investi- fraud filed collected
gations
Riverside 22,005 4,743 507 51 $303,061
San Diego 24,070 3,854 1222 11 $104,425
Fresno 24,988 195 107 8 $96,299
Sacramento 28,960 610 449 20 $220,510
SanBan 34,184 1,550 718 5 $117,238Bernardino
Riverside 22,005 4,743 507 51 $303,061
Notes:
1. Information gathered from CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., supra note 185, at 5 tbl.1, 7 tbl.3,
10 tbl.6.
199 CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1999).
200 Frederick Melo, Stopping Welfare Cheats: Differing Approaches in Washington
County and Dakota County, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Aug. 17, 2008 (discussing differing
penalties for welfare fraud among Minnesota counties).
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There is a push to bring criminal rather than administrative penalties
against welfare cheats in California. In the fourth quarter of 2007, 417
cases were referred for criminal prosecution in California while only 43
cases were referred to Administrative Disqualification Hearings.20 1 The
disparities among counties in practices and outcomes may reflect
differences in the county welfare populations or differences in prosecutorial
enthusiasm on the part of county authorities. Research and evaluation are
clearly needed on the dramatic disparities among counties, and states, in
rates of welfare fraud prosecution
3. The Unmeasured Costs (and the Fuzzy Math) of Pursuing Welfare Fraud
The drive to punish welfare cheats and to increase the administrative
and criminal penalties for those who are caught cheating seems to prevent
policymakers from analyzing the goals, effects, and costs of punishing
welfare cheats. Many prosecutors' offices across the county have pursued
individuals (mostly women) for welfare fraud with a zealotry that belies the
actual public threat or criminal intent associated with this problem.
In 1997, Erik Luna, then a Deputy District Attorney in San Diego and
now a law professor, wrote a law review article declaring, "Welfare fraud is
an epidemic. 2 °2  That view, however, assumes that the problem of
individuals making misrepresentations to the welfare office and receiving
some level of benefits to which they are not entitled outweighs the problem
of poverty in the United States. While a public conversation about the
relative weights of these problems has not occurred, the policies being
proposed, and often implemented, commonly reflect assessments like
Luna's. With 9.8% of U.S. families falling below the poverty level in
2006,203 many might argue that poverty itself remains a chronic condition
and a concern of government.
One of the difficulties in evaluating the success of punitive and
criminalizing approaches to welfare is that the goals of these strategies are
often unstated, multiple, and even contradictory. According to welfare
officials, welfare fraud measures are designed to achieve several goals: to
catch welfare cheats, to deter would-be and actual welfare cheats, and to
reduce governmental costs. The first goal, catching cheats, is one that the
system is certainly achieving. The problem, however, is that the vast
201 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., supra note 185, at 2.
202 Erik G. Luna, Welfare Fraud and the Fourth Amendment, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1235,
1235 (1997).
203 U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables tbl.13, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/poverty/histpov/hstpov13.html (last visited May 15, 2009).
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majority of welfare recipients are technically welfare cheats. If they were
not, they would be unable to survive.
Whether fraud is actually deterred cannot be easily measured. As
Professor Dan Kahan writes, "Empirically, deterrence claims are
2,04speculative." Deterrence theory assumes that individuals can foresee the
penalties of rule-breaking. But research has revealed that the harsh
205penalties for welfare cheating are largely unknown by welfare recipients.
Unless welfare recipients are aware of the severe consequences for rule-
breaking, those can have no deterrent effects on welfare recipients' actions.
Cesare Beccaria, who wrote On Crimes and Punishment in the mid-
eighteenth century, called for a rational system of criminal punishment.2 °6
Under this system, individuals must be informed of both the rules and the
consequences of violating the rules.2 °7 With this knowledge, Beccaria
theorized, individuals would be able to weigh the costs of rule-breaking and
opt to follow the rules rather than risk the long-term consequences of
pursuing short-term gain. This cost-benefit system of deterrence, however,
cannot function where neither the rules nor the consequences of rule-
breaking are known by individuals.208 The system also cannot function
where immediate needs actually do outweigh the risks of long-term
suffering.
When I interviewed an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) who headed
the welfare fraud investigation unit in a Northern California county, even he
questioned the deterrent and retributive aspects of the push to punish
welfare cheats in the criminal system. When interviewed by phone in
March of 1999, the ADA said that his office at that time filed about 100 to
110 felony welfare fraud cases a month.20 9 He criticized the state standard
for fraud, saying that "it targets the wrong people," adding that the system
204 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416
(1999).
205 Gustafson, supra note 142, at 214 (finding that most of the welfare recipients
interviewed were unaware that "underreporting of income could result not only in a civil
claim demanding repayment, but also criminal fraud charges and lifelong exclusion from the
welfare system").
206 See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963) (1764).
207 Id. at 17-18 (discussing the importance of making rules known).
208 Id. at 94 ("Do you want to prevent crimes? See to it that the laws are clear and simple
and that the entire force of a nation is united in their defense, and that no part of it is
employed to destroy them. See to it that the laws favor not so much classes of men as men
themselves.").
209 Telephone Interview with Jim Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, Welfare Fraud
Division, in Bayview County, Cal. (May 30, 1999) (note on file with author). Name and
location have been changed to protect the identity of the interviewee.
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"traps and punishes the least culpable culprits."2 10  He recognized that it
was hard-working and financially-strapped mothers who were hardest hit by
these policies and practices.
The ADA explained that while his office pursued cases identified
through computerized income matching, the office also pursued a lot of
cases that were reported anonymously through the welfare fraud hotline.
The hotline paved an arbitrary track to welfare investigations for many
people. The ADA said that the hotline was used by individuals in personal
disputes: "No one can snitch you off like your ex or your ex's girlfriend or
your neighbor or your landlord. 21  At the time of our interview, the ADA
said the investigators had 300 to 500 hotline tips backlogged for
investigation; hundreds of poor individuals were awaiting an unpleasant
surprise.
The effects of deterrent criminal policies are generally elusive. How
does one measure what is not happening? Many state officials calculate the
costs and savings of fraud deterrent measures by employing models that
involve questionable speculations. Estimations of any state savings in
aggressive fraud control policies are usually based on either: (1)
assumptions that anyone removed from the welfare rolls would have been
receiving full benefits indefinitely, or (2) assumptions that declines in
welfare caseloads are attributable only to fraud deterrence measures and
that the caseload would otherwise have remained constant. Welfare
officials and local prosecutors often request increased funding for welfare
fraud prosecution, arguing that by ending payments to those convicted and
making claims for overpayments, the state makes money. Most of the
overpayments (80% statewide according to the ADA) are reclaimed from
the payments that continue to children, not through actual payment by the
welfare recipient.212 In other words, dollars recouped generally come out of
the government benefits flowing to children. Actual recoupment of dollars
through direct payments from cheating welfare recipients is quite low.
213
210 Id. A 2003 Los Angeles County audit similarly found that fraud investigations were
not prioritized, meaning that cases with high dollar values were not necessarily given priority
over cases involving small amounts of overpayments. COUNTY OF L.A. DEP'T OF AUDITOR-
CONTROLLER, supra note 187, at 8.
211 Telephone Interview with Stevens, supra note 209.
212 Id.
213 California data for the fourth quarter of 2008 show that while more than $30 million
in overpayments to CalWORKs payments were identified, only $12.9 million dollars were
recovered by the state. CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., QUARTERLY REPORT OF OVERPAYMENTS
AND COLLECTIONS-CALWORKs 1 (2009), available at http://www.cdss.ca.gov/research/res/
pdf/CA%20812/2008/CA812Oet-DecO8.pdf. Of the money recouped, only $2.8 million was
collected as cash payments; another $9.8 million was recovered by reducing cash grants to
families who continued to receive aid. Id.
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Many assume that disqualifying a parent or family from TANF aid
ultimately reduces government costs, but this is not necessarily true. For
example, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's 2007-2008 Budget
proposed changes to state administrative rules of welfare receipt so that: (1)
where a parent was found to be in noncompliance with program rules for
more than 90 days, the family would lose their entire cash grant, not just the
parent's portion of the grant; and (2) aid would be limited to sixty months
for TANF child-only cases-cases where children qualify for cash aid, but
where parents are disqualified either because they are immigrants (legal or
undocumented) or because they have been convicted of drug offenses.
2 14
These families would receive no cash benefits, though most would be
entitled to some amount of food stamps. The budget itself estimated that
the full-family sanctions would increase state costs by $11.4 million during
the fiscal year.2 15 And while the Governor's budget estimated that the
exclusion of child-only cases would save the state $160 million,216 analysis
by administrators for Los Angeles County concluded that if even half of the
excluded children in Los Angeles subsequently applied for county-provided
General Relief, for which they would qualify, welfare cost in that county
alone would rise between $74.2 to $103.2 million.2 17 In short, the proposal
would have raised government costs throughout the state, though shifting
costs from federal and state funding streams to county coffers. The
legislature voted down the proposal, but the very same proposal appeared
again in the Governor's 2008-2009 Budget.218
The government costs associated with policing and prosecuting
welfare fraud are high and are often underestimated.219 In addition to the
costs of overpayments, costs of investigations, and costs of prosecutions,
there are a number of other unmeasured costs of aggressively prosecuting
214 CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2007-08 GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 7, 9
(2007).
215 Id. at 7.
216 Id.
217 DAVID E. JANSSEN & BRYCE YOKOMIZO, COUNTY OF L.A. CHIEF ADMIN. OFFICE,
ADDENDUM TO THE JANUARY 18, 2007 REPORT ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
WELFARE PROPOSAL 3 (2007).
218 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 177.
219 A 2003 report noted that Los Angeles County alone spent $32 million per year on
welfare fraud investigations (prevention and detection). COUNTY OF L.A. DEP'T OF AUDITOR-
CONTROLLER, supra note 187, at 1. By comparison, the California Franchise Tax Board
spent less than a third as much ($10.5 million) in 2005-2006 investigating tax fraud
throughout the entire state. STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., OPERATIONS REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2006, 17 (2008), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/
aboutftb/Oprpt/OpRpt-0506.pdf.
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welfare fraud. One of those costs is the cost to families. 220 Low-income
families that include an adult charged with welfare fraud not only lose
access to government benefits, they also gain an adult with decreased
earning capacity as a result of the criminal prosecution.
There are still other unmeasured costs to welfare fraud prosecution.
When a welfare recipient is charged with fraud, she adds costs to the
criminal justice system. In addition to the costs of investigation, the county
has to pay for the time of both a prosecutor and public defender. If the
recipient goes through a welfare fraud diversion program (discussed more
in the following Part), the county bears continuing administrative costs for
collecting payments and monitoring her progress in the diversion program.
If the welfare recipient is convicted and sent to jail or prison, then
government costs soar. The California Department of Corrections estimates
the annual cost of housing an inmate at $35,587,221 much more than an
entire family receives per year through the welfare system.222 If the head of
a household does end up serving time in jail or prison, her children may be
placed in the foster care system, where much more money will be spent on
the children than under the welfare system. Finally, if the welfare recipient
receives probation, the county must cover the wages of the probation
officer. All of these costs are ignored in calculations of the costs of
investigating and prosecuting welfare fraud.
In sum, the government cost savings that policymakers associate with
punitive and criminalizing welfare policies may actually only be cost-
220 A poignant example of the unmeasured family costs of welfare fraud prosecutions
occurred in the case of Jerome (a pseudonym), a father I interviewed as part of a study on
welfare rule knowledge and rule compliance. Jerome was single-handedly caring for his
toddler child. The toddler's mother ended up spending a year in jail after her sister called the
welfare hotline and reported that Jerome was living in the household. The sister had hoped
that officials would kick Jerome out of the house. Instead, they arrested and convicted the
mother of welfare fraud. Jerome, who had been employed while staying with his son and
girlfriend, could not find employment after she went to jail. While he received a sanctioned
aid check for his son, he was ineligible for child care assistance because of his earlier
admission to the welfare office that he had been living in his girlfriend's home. Jerome and
his son were renting a small room (a converted garage) from Jerome's ex-wife, and the boy
had spent a year without his mother.
221 CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., FOURTH QUARTER 2008 FACTS AND FIGURES,
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/Adult_Operations/docs/Fourth_
Quarter_2008_Facts-andFigures.pdf (last visited May 15, 2009).
222 The average cash welfare payment to a family receiving CaIWORKs in January 2008
was $528.80. A year on aid at that rate would total $6,344.60. CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS.,
supra note 179, at 4. CalWORKs recipients generally qualify for other forms of public
assistance, including food stamps, which max out at $463 per month for a family of three,
and Medicaid. Still, the overall state cost to provide for a family on welfare is lower than the
cost of housing one inmate.
2009]
KAAR YN GUSTAFSON
shifting-either between federal, state, and local coffers; or from the
welfare system to the criminal justice and foster care systems.
4. Recent Trends
Criminal prosecutions in California have become less vigorous in the
last few years. In 1998, the State of California incentivized welfare
prosecutions by the counties by rewarding them (at 25% of any
overpayment determined) for prosecutions.223 The 2002-2003 California
Budget, however, eliminated the $5.1 million welfare fraud incentive
payments that had been provided to counties. 224  Since then, fraud
prosecutions have dropped significantly. In the third quarter of 2001,
prosecutions were filed in 19% of all the investigations referred to
prosecutors; by the same period in 2005, 15% were filed; in the same period
in 2007, 8% were filed.225
Over the last four years, while California counties have become more
aggressive in investigating welfare recipients for fraud-particularly at the
time of application for aid-the State appears to be scaling back on criminal
prosecutions.226 This decline cannot be attributed solely to the declining
welfare caseload and increased investigations at the time families apply for
benefits. The reduced state incentives to counties for identifying and
recovering overpayments, 227 and the county-borne costs of aggressive
investigation and prosecution, are also likely contributors to the decline. At
the same time that prosecutions appear to be declining in California, other
states are apparently becoming more willing to bring criminal rather than
civil sanctions, though few cases nationwide seem to go to trial.228
223 California Assembly Bill 1542 added CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 114860) (West
2001). The bill provided each county "25 percent of the State's share of the client-caused
Cal-WORKs overpayment collections." Memorandum from Bruce Wagstaff, Dep't of Soc.
Serv., All-County Information Notice 1-58-98, 1 (Oct. 14, 1998). Congress later passed the
Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, which provided a 12.5% incentive to the states
for welfare fraud prosecutions and which required states to compile information on
overpayments and underpayments of benefits. Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350 (codified
as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 (2006)).
224 GRAY DAVIS, STATE OF CAL. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S BUDGET
HIGHLIGHTS 48 (2002). The federal incentives remain, providing counties with 12.5% of the
aid repaid or recovered by a county. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 114860) (West Supp.
2009).
225 See Cal. Dep't of Soc. Serv., Fraud Investigation Report,
http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/research/PG363.htm (last visited May 15, 2009) (prosecution
activity).
226 Id.
227 See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
228 I have gathered information about the welfare fraud prosecution practices in a number
of states. A full analysis of the trends is too extensive to summarize here and creates a rich
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The amount of tax dollars devoted to policing welfare fraud is also on the
rise.229 In large part, the costs are rising because the number of welfare fraud
investigators is rising. Two reasons appear to account for the rising number
of welfare fraud investigators in a period in which welfare caseloads are
declining. First, much of the welfare money that flows to states and
opportunity for future research. There are notable divergences among states. In a few
states-Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin-prosecutors typically avoid criminal
charges for welfare fraud. In a large and seemingly growing number of states, however, the
move is to punish welfare cheats through criminal charges rather than civil penalties. Also
notable is that a growing number of states and localities are creating welfare fraud diversion
programs, allowing welfare recipients to avoid criminal conviction and jail time if they pay
restitution to the state.
In the model of drug diversion programs, these fraud diversion programs usually allow
welfare recipients who have violated the rules to engage in some sort of restitution-usually
repayment, but in some cases home monitoring-to have their sentences suspended or
removed from their records. These programs, however, are quite different from drug
diversion programs. First, the welfare fraud diversion programs are often being promoted by
prosecutors rather than by advocates for the poor. The reasons are clear: fraud diversion is a
quick way to process the cases through the criminal justice system. Second, the goal of
rehabilitation is absent since the underlying cause of the crime, poverty, goes unaddressed.
Third, in some locales the purpose of the fraud diversion programs appears to be to
stigmatize those who engage in welfare fraud rather than redeem them. (One welfare fraud
diversion program in California required participants to show up in person at a window
labeled "welfare fraud payments" periodically to pay a nominal sum; another required
participants to wear ankle monitoring bracelets.)
The welfare fraud diversion programs share some of the same problems as the drug
diversion programs. First, the effects of the fraud diversion programs have been the subject
of even less research than the drug diversion programs. Second, there is anecdotal evidence
that many participants in the welfare fraud diversion programs do not or cannot comply with
the conditions of participation, specifically the repayment requirement. Third, it may be
that, as in the case of the drug courts, more individuals are finding themselves under the
control of the criminal justice system than they would were the diversion programs not
available. This is because weak cases do not get dropped by prosecutors, and those who fail
to meet the administrative requirements of the diversion programs find themselves either
under the control of the criminal justice system for a longer time than they would have been
if they had been charged, or they find themselves ultimately facing felony charges. See Eric
J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1558-60 (2004) (explaining that rather than reducing
state incapacitation of offenders, diversion programs may instead be widening the net and
simply changing types of state-imposed incapacitation of offenders).
229 Dorothy Brown, dismissing the idea that wage-earning taxpayers escape the heavy
policing of welfare recipients, suggests that the criminalization of welfare is now seeping
into tax policy. She explains that recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit, a credit for
low-wage earners, are now targets for IRS audits. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class
Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 795 (2007) ("Welfare stereotypes ... do
apply to low-income taxpayers because even though the low-income taxpayer credit was
created as an alternative to welfare, low-income taxpayers are viewed as lazy former welfare




counties is federal money. If that money is not spent, the states and
counties lose it; rather than laying off government employees and losing the
stream of federal funding, many counties are transferring former welfare
caseworkers and civil fraud investigators into positions as deputized welfare
fraud investigators.230
Second, the welfare fraud investigators are gaining political leverage.
Welfare fraud investigators are unionizing.231 In many states they have
formed associations and even hired lobbyists.232 These associations urge
legislators to step-up efforts to investigate and prosecute welfare fraud and
233to move investigations from the civil to the criminal arena. Whether
these efforts to criminalize welfare fraud investigations are in the real
interests of the public or merely an example of the power of self-interested
bureaucrats remains an open question.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
Substantively, the government is treating welfare recipients as
criminals. Procedurally, welfare recipients are treated as individuals who
have already been convicted rather than individuals who are presumed
innocent. Over the last four decades, the welfare system has been a place
230 In 2002, the Santa Clara County (California) Board of Supervisors approved a
proposal to re-assign thirty-seven employees from positions in the welfare office to positions
as criminal investigators. Bd. of Supervisors, Santa Clara County, Agenda, Item No. 27
(June 25, 2002) (on file with author).
231 See WELFARE FRAUD INVESTIGATORS ASS'N, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE ALAMEDA COUNTY WELFARE FRAUD INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATION AND THE
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, JULY 16, 2006-JUNE 27, 2011, 1 (2007) (describing the agreement
signed by the "Alameda County Welfare Fraud Investigators Association, affiliated with
Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3").
232 For example, consider the California Welfare Fraud Investigators Association, "a
nonprofit organization dedicated to developing the professionalism of Welfare Fraud and
Medi-Cal Investigators throughout the state by sponsoring annual training conferences,
identifying and supporting regional training sessions, and through legislative interaction."
The California Welfare Fraud Investigators Association Home Page, http://www.cwfia.org
(last visited May 15, 2009). Other associations include: The Alabama Council on Welfare
Fraud; The Colorado Welfare Fraud Council; Iowa Council on Welfare Fraud; the Minnesota
Fraud Investigators Association; the Ohio Council on Welfare Fraud; the New York Welfare
Fraud Investigators Association; the Welfare Investigators of California Arizona Nevada
(WICAN); and the United Council on Welfare, an umbrella organization for welfare fraud
associations in both the United States and Canada.
233 The California Welfare Fraud Investigators Association introduced a bill requiring all
welfare fraud investigators to complete a special course approved by the Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training. A.B. 2059, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). They
also introduced a bill extending leaves of absence in lieu of temporary disability benefits
from public safety investigators to welfare fraud investigators. S.B. 125, 2003-2004 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2003) (enacted).
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where rights are denied. Throughout the 1960s, welfare recipients and
advocates fashioned a litigation strategy aimed at having the Supreme Court
recognize a right to subsistence rooted in the U.S. Constitution.234 The
Supreme Court, however, refused to recognize a fundamental right to
subsistence. The Court held that public assistance to the poor was merely a
statutory entitlement, to be given and withheld as legislators pleased, so
long as terminations of individual benefits are preceded by notice and an
opportunity for hearing.235 While the Court did articulate minimal due
process rights, even those rights have proved elusive.
A. THE EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Welfare recipients are denied basic rights of citizenship, including
rights to privacy and to adequate due process. The Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution protects the right of people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... ,236 The Fourteenth Amendment has been found to guarantee
individuals a right to privacy.237 The scope of Fourth Amendment freedoms
and privacy rights has been a recurrent issue in the federal courts for the last
four decades, and Fourth Amendment claims that would seem reasonable
among members of the general populous have been evaluated differently for
welfare recipients.
Intrusions into the daily lives of welfare recipients have always been a
part of the welfare system. Even after the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare prohibited welfare offices from implementing the "substitute
father" rule and the U.S. Supreme Court found the "substitute father"
presumption inconsistent with the statutory aims of the Social Security Act
to provide assistance to needy children, 23 warrantless searches-and even
midnight raids-continued to be conducted on welfare recipients. From the
1970s until the late 1990s, however, welfare recipients were generally not
subject to routine home visits by welfare officials. The personal intrusions
involved demand that the details of personal life be recorded on paper, not
that the details of daily home life be viewed by the government.
234 See generally MARTHA DAVIs, BRUTAL NEED (1993) (offering a history of the
lawyer's movement for welfare rights in the 1960s and 1970s).
235 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding the loss of welfare benefits a
deprivation sufficient to trigger due process rights, but inadequate to trigger substantive
constitutional rights).
236 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
237 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (discussing the "zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
238 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 329 (1968).
2009]
KAARYN GUSTAFSON
It is important to note that since the federal welfare reforms of 1996,
many welfare advocates have actually encouraged more home visits
(though not home searches) of welfare recipients. 239 These advocates argue
that caseworkers are failing to identify and serve welfare recipients who
have disabilities, particularly in the form of mental illnesses,2 40 as well as
those who are the victims of domestic violence. Both categories of
recipients are usually entitled to both additional services and exemptions
from certain welfare rules, including work requirements and time limits.
These advocates are pushing for visits by community organizations or
social workers trained to identify signs of disability and domestic violence,
not visits by law enforcement officers.241 Social workers are mandatory
reporters of child abuse and neglect, but are not mandatory reporters of
welfare fraud. Moreover, the advocates are seeking consensual, not
mandatory, visits.
The level of privacy that welfare recipients enjoy in their homes has
been an issue of controversy for years, particularly in California. During
the 1960s, California welfare offices conducted mass morning raids on the
homes of AFDC recipients to determine program eligibility.2 42  The
California Supreme Court, in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, ruled
that unannounced, early-morning visits of welfare caseworkers to the
239 Cary LaCheen, New Provisions of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Program: Implications for Clients with Disabilities and Advocacy Opportunities, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 490, 500-01 (2007) (touting state programs that "use home visits and
other outreach ways to determine the reason for noncompliance, to assist in attending
appointments, and to deal with barriers to compliance"); see also ANDREA WILKINS, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ITEM No. 6900-0005, STRATEGIES FOR HARD-TO-
SERVE TANF RECIPIENTS 13 (2002) (suggesting that welfare departments "[i]mplement
home visits for time-limited or sanctioned families to ensure the well-being of children in
these families").
240 CARY LACHEEN, WELFARE LAW CTR., HOME ALONE: THE URGENT NEED FOR HOME
VISITS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN NEW YORK CITY'S WELFARE SYSTEM 27 (2004)
(demanding that New York's welfare agency "[p]rovide home visits to all applicants and
recipients with physical or mental health problems that severely limit their ability to travel to
appointment or wait in waiting rooms for extended periods of time").
241 GREGORY Acs & PAMELA LOPREST, THE URBAN INST., A STUDY OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA'S TANF CASELOAD 54 (2003) (describing the District of Columbia's policy of
having community organizations conduct home visits with families who are being
sanctioned for noncompliance with welfare rules).
242 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 233, 224 (Cal. 1967). The raids were
intended to find men who might be cohabiting with the female welfare recipients. The case
was brought by Benny Parrish, the caseworker who, citing King, 392 U.S. at 309, refused to
participate in midnight raids to enforce the substitute parent rule. Parrish was subsequently
fired and challenged his dismissal. The Supreme Court had to determine whether he was
being asked to engage in unlawful conduct on the job, which is how the Court reached the
issue of the lawfulness of early morning raids. As a result, many law students read this case
in Employment Law courses rather than Poverty Law courses.
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homes of welfare recipients "transgressed constitutional limitations. 243
The searches involved "thorough searches of the entire dwelling., 244 The
court found that the majority of the searches were conducted when there
245was no suspicion at all of wrongdoing, much less probable cause. The
County argued that the searches were intended to determine welfare
eligibility and not to search for evidence of crimes, and that the searches
therefore did not have Fourth Amendment implications. The California
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that evidence of welfare
cheating could be used in criminal prosecutions and that the loss of benefits
amounted to a forfeiture of property.246
The California Supreme Court in Parrish also ruled that unannounced
searches could not be considered consent-based. The ruling states:
The persons subjected to the instant operation confronted far more than the
amorphous threat of official displeasure which necessarily attends any such request.
The request for entry by persons whom the beneficiaries knew to posses virtually
unlimited power over their very livelihood posed a threat which was far more certain,
immediate, and substantial. These circumstances nullify the legal effectiveness of the
apparent consent secured ....
In short, there could be no valid waiver of constitutional rights under
such coercive circumstances.
In Wyman v. James, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the issue of
home visits to welfare recipients. 248  A majority of Justices ruled that
mandatory home visits by social workers from the welfare department did
not violate the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches or
the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.249 In that case, however, the
visits: (1) were announced, (2) did not involve full searches of the home, (3)
were conducted by social workers, not law enforcement officers, and (4)
resulted in civil rather than criminal penalties where welfare recipients were
found to be violating the rules.
Justice Blackmun, writing for majority in Wyman, distinguished the
New York home visits at issue from the searches described in Parrish.
Justice Blackmun wrote:
The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has appropriate and
paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper
objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it
243 Parrish, 425 P.2d at 225.
244 Id. at 226.
245 Id. at 225.
246 Id. at 227.
247 Id. at 229-30.
248 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
249 Id. at 326.
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dispenses. Sure it is not unreasonable, in the Fourth Amendment sense or in any other
sense of that term, that the State have at its command a gentle means, of limited extent
and ofpractical and considerate application, of achieving that assurance.2
The home visits, of which the welfare recipient was given written
notice for the specific date of the visit and which were conducted by
welfare social workers,5 were gentle and limited. No law enforcement
officers were involved.252 Blackmun pointed out that the plaintiff offered
"nothing that supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its
,,253purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity. Blackmun
clearly stated that the home visit in Wyman, unlike the home search in
Parrish, was a reasonable one because it was "not a criminal investigation,
d[id] not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced
fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, [wa]s not in aid of any
criminal proceeding., 25 4  Justice Douglas's dissent in Wyman-joined by
Justice Marshall-expressed concern that the home visits, whether targeting
criminal activity or not, infringed on fundamental constitutional rights,
255particularly the right to privacy. Douglas suggested that government
officials should only enter a home with either valid consent of the resident
or with a warrant; to do otherwise runs counter to Fourth Amendment
protections. 56 Justice Marshall, in a separate dissenting opinion, wrote that
250 Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added).
251 Id. at 320-21 (specifically stating that under the procedures "[p]rivacy is
emphasized").
252 "The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority. It is made by a caseworker of
some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of
the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility." Id. at 322-23.
253 Id. at 321. The plaintiff Barbara James, it appears, may have feared not a fraud
charge, but rather an abuse or neglect charge. The Supreme Court noted that her welfare
case file contained comments from a caseworker that "all was not always well with the
infant Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The picture is a sad
and unhappy one." Id. at 322 n.9.
254 Id. at 323.
255 Douglas, acknowledging both the stigmatized status of the poor and the ease with
which their rights are disregarded, wrote:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent cotton or wheat
farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops, would not the approach be different?
Welfare in aid of dependent children, like social security and unemployment benefits, has an
aura of suspicion. There doubtless are frauds in every sector of public welfare whether the
recipient be a Barbara James or someone who is prominent or influential. But constitutional
rights-here the privacy of the home-are obviously not dependent on the poverty or on the
affluence of the beneficiary. It is the precincts of the home that the Fourth Amendment protects;
and their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.
Id. at 332-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
256 Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]f inspectors want to enter the precincts of the
home against the wishes of the lady of the house, they must get a warrant.").
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it was disingenuous to describe home visits as something other than
criminal investigations when visits were partially motivated by a desire to
find evidence of fraud and child abuse (both felonies) and to eliminate
benefits, which he viewed as a civil forfeiture.257
Although Wyman v. James upheld home visits, home visits ended in
most locales following federal policy changes requiring welfare offices to
devote more resources to gathering paper records that verified eligibility.
The San Diego home searches of welfare recipients, begun in 1997, marked
a dramatic return to old practices. Los Angeles County soon followed,
implementing home visits in 1999 after a television broadcast raised
concerns about welfare fraud in the county.258 Los Angeles County
officials claimed that the purpose of the home visits was twofold: to
eliminate fraud and to identify individual needs for supportive services.
259
Under that home visit program, soon after a new welfare case was opened,
an Eligibility Worker, specially trained in the details of supportive services
and identifying potential fraud, made an announced visit to the home of the
260applicant. Welfare recipients were notified that the visits would occur
between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. during the ten days following notice.261
The home visits lasted from around thirty to forty-five minutes and included
a one- to two-minute walk-through of the home.262 Where the Eligibility
Workers found the applications to be fraudulent, they denied benefits, but
did not refer individuals for criminal prosecution.263
A group of welfare applicants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
challenging the home visits, but the California Court of Appeals, in Smith v.
Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, dismissed the action.264 The court ruled
that the home visits did not contradict the purpose of the state welfare
257 Id. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258 Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 703 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting the
broadcast as the trigger for the home visit program).
259 Id. at 703. According to county officials, the purpose was:
[T]o explain the CalWORKs program to the participant and to discuss the availability of
supportive services. Supportive services include educational, child care, transportation, domestic
violence, substance abuse, and mental health services. During the interview, the HIP Eligibility
Worker (EW) also notes any indications of circumstances that are inconsistent with the case
information. For example, if children will be aided on the case, the HIP EW will look for
evidence that children live in the home. If the participant claims that the father is an absent
parent, the HIP EW will look for indications that the father lives in the home.
COUNTY OF L.A. DEP'T OF AUDITOR-CONTROLLER, supra note 187, at 3.
260 Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
261 Id. at 712.
262 Id. at 705.
263 Id. at 704.
264 Id. at 702 (affirming the Superior Court's dismissal of the claims).
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statute because the purpose of the searches was to determine eligibility.265
The judges also pointed to evidence that welfare home visits had occurred
in the past in California, though they failed to note that such visits had
generally not occurred for close to thirty years.266 The decision noted that
the petitioners had not offered evidence that there was a method other than
a home search to verify a welfare applicant's address or to determine the
presence of an undisclosed adult in the household.267 The judges did not
address the fact that neither of these determinations required actual entry
into the home.
268
The judges also concluded both that searches of welfare recipients'
homes do not substantially intrude on their privacy 269 and that home visits,
if they are searches at all, fall within the "special needs" exception to the
Fourth Amendment. 27' During the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down a series of decisions allowing the government to conduct
suspicionless searches of individuals where particular safety concerns were
271at issue. Most special needs cases have arisen in the contexts of drug and
weapons smuggling-both of which pose serious safety concerns-in
settings such as jails, prisons, and schools. Additionally, the cases have
generally involved individuals who are under state control because of their
vulnerability-for example, minor students 272---or individuals who are
either suspected or convicted of criminal activity. At the time Smith was
decided, all of the home searches that the U.S. Supreme Court had approved
265 Id. at 709.
266 The decision states that "in the past, when caseloads were not so high and budgets not
so tight, home visits were the norm in the eligibility determination process." Id.
267 Id. at 705.
268 For example, a knock on the door without entry into the home would generally suffice
to verify an applicant's address and determine the presence of additional adults living in the
home. Moreover, the computer database cross-checks that are now conducted can already
identify additional taxpayers, benefit recipients, or vehicle owners reporting a given address
as a residence.
269 Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
270 Id. at 711-12.
271 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (allowing search of
probationer's home without probable cause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42
(1985) (allowing searches of high school students by school authorities based on reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979)
(allowing visual inspection body cavity searches of pre-trial detainees following detainees'
contact with visitors).
272 See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (allowing random
drug testing of student athletes based on "special needs" of public schools); TL.O., 469 U.S.
at 337-42.
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under the special needs exception involved parolees and probationers 273 -
individuals convicted of criminal wrongdoing,274
San Diego's home searches are more intrusive than any other program
challenged in the courts. The searches are unannounced full searches of
private dwellings; they are conducted by deputized law enforcement
officers, and they occur before a welfare applicant ever receives a check.
The American Civil Liberties Union, representing a number of welfare
recipients in San Diego, brought claims in federal district court challenging
San Diego's practices.275 The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals where, in 2006, two of the three sitting judges agreed that the
home searches were lawful.
276
Judge Tashima, writing for himself and Judge Kleinfeld, concluded
that the home searches were not searches under the Fourth Amendment
because "the home visits are conducted with the applicant's consent" and
because "there is no penalty for refusing to consent to the home visit, other
than denial of benefits. 2 77 Acknowledging that recent Supreme Court case
law had recognized consensual administrative searches as covered by the
Fourth Amendment,278 he then reasoned that even if the San Diego home
visits were searches, they were reasonable ones. He further argued that any
intrusions into a welfare applicant's privacy were outweighed by important
government interests, namely the public's "strong interest in ensuring that
aid provided from tax dollars reaches its proper and intended recipients. 279
273 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 113 (2001) (upholding warrantless
investigative search of probationer's dwelling where there was reasonable suspicion for
search and where unconditional searches were included in terms of probation). The decision
in Knights states that "probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled. Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a
court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." Id. at 119 (citations omitted). The analogy of
special needs searches of probationers to searches of welfare recipients suggests that welfare
recipients also do not enjoy the freedoms of law-abiding citizens.
274 See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (allowing search of probationer's home without
probable cause).
275 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27538 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2003). The district court later enjoined fraud investigators' collateral contacts-for example,
interviews with neighbors or landlords-conducted without the consent of the welfare
applicants. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27351, *22 (S.D. Cal.,
May 9, 2003).
276 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh 'g denied, reh 'g en
bane denied, 483 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 649 (2007).
277 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921.
278 Id. at 922 n.8.
279 Id. at 923.
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Judge Tashima went on to argue that the San Diego home visits
properly fell under the "special needs" exception to the warrant
requirement. 28 Tashima concluded that verifying welfare eligibility was a
special need akin to that of supervising probationers and minor student
athletes, without explaining why those groups of individuals were
analogous. 281  Tashima also wrote that while information gathered by
welfare fraud investigators might be used for general law enforcement
purposes,282 the primary use was for verification of eligibility and
prevention of fraud. While he acknowledged that welfare recipients have a
right to privacy, he wrote that a welfare recipient's "relationship with the
state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even within the
sanctity of the home," 283 and that the state need not use less intrusive
measures, even when they are available.28 4
Judge Fisher's dissenting opinion in Sanchez focused on Wyman v.
James and distinguished the unannounced, full home searches by deputized
officers from the brief, pre-announced visits by social workers in Wyman.
Fisher wrote: "Neither Wyman nor the special needs doctrine renders
constitutional the entry and inspection of homes ... by agents of the district
attorney without warrants, probable cause or individualized suspicion of
ineligibility or fraud., 28 5 Fisher expressed particular dissatisfaction with the
arguments that welfare recipients have lower expectations of privacy in the
home than anyone else and that the special needs exception to the warrant
requirement should apply in this case.28 6
Though the welfare applicants sought to have the issue re-heard by the
full panel of Ninth Circuit judges, less than a majority of the judges thought
280 Id. at 925.
281 Id. at 925 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (upholding
warrantless searches of the homes of probationers as a special need); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of student high school
athletes as a special need)).
282 Warrantless and suspicionless searches for the purposes of general law enforcement
purposes were found to violate the Fourth Amendment in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 83 (2001) (putting a halt to suspicionless drug testing of pregnant women in a
public hospital).
283 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 927 (emphasis added).
284 Id. at 928. The Supreme Court in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 672 n.2 (1989), upheld drug testing of public employees by explaining that,
like the pre-announced welfare home visits in Wyman, it was the least intrusive means
available, suggesting that, at least at one point in time, the notion of least intrusive means
was important to the special needs doctrine.
285 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 940 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("[U]nlike convicted felons, welfare applicants have
no lesser expectation of privacy in their homes than the rest of us.").
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the issue merited a rehearing. 287 Eight of the judges who favored a
rehearing joined their voices in a dissent authored by Judge Harry
Pregerson. The dissenting opinion stated in part: "The government's
general interest in preventing fraud cannot justify such highly intrusive
searches of homes where no grounds for suspicion exist. Welfare
applicants are ordinary people who, due to lack of adequate funds, find
themselves applying for life-sustaining government benefits. 288
Increasingly, however, judges, policymakers, and everyday individuals do
not view welfare recipients as ordinary people.
Pregerson's dissenting opinion appropriately labeled Judge Tashima's
majority opinion as "an [a]ssault on the [p]oor,"' 89 for an assault it surely
was. There is no legitimate consent in the case of San Diego welfare
recipients; 290 rather, the recipients are placed in coercive situations where
they must make choices based on "brutal need.,, 29 1  Nonetheless, the
majority in Sanchez rejected the argument that San Diego's welfare office
placed unconstitutional conditions upon receipt of welfare by forcing
welfare applicants to give up their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.292 While individuals regularly endure government intrusion into
293
their lives, such as when they receive driver's licenses or student loans,
287 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007).
288 Id. at 968 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
289 Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
290 Consent is determined by the "totality of all the circumstances," and elements
suggesting that the search was non-voluntary and that the individual searched did not
perceive a right to refuse render a consent-based search unlawful. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 230 (1972). A federal judge in Minnesota, applying the
totality of the circumstances standard, ruled that a search was rendered nonconsensual by the
mere fact that a welfare recipient's refusal to allow caseworkers to search her home would
result in the termination of benefits. Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1223, 1225 (D.
Minn. 1979). The opinion states, "The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
is an absolute right. It in no way is qualified by whether or not evidence of an illegal activity
is actually possessed or being concealed. A violation of this right is per se damaging." Id. at
1229. This case arose before the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the ever-expanding
"special needs" exception. See supra notes 271-274.
291 This term was used by the district court in Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), and quoted in the majority opinion of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261
(1970). The term was used to describe situations where-even absent the life, liberty, or
property claims usually required to anchor a due process claim-a right to procedural due
process might exist.
292 Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir. 2006).
293 More than forty years ago Charles Reich noted, "When government-national, state,
or local-hands out something of value, whether a relief check or a television license,
government's power grows forthwith; it automatically gains such power as is necessary and
proper to supervise its largess. It obtains new rights to investigate, to regulate, and to
punish." Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 746 (1964). Reich
specifically warned of such intrusions:
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those who are not suspected or convicted of criminal activity are understood
to enjoy protections from government intrusion into their dwellings. The
reality that individuals forfeit these protections once their incomes drop
below a certain floor is deeply troubling.
Recent California case law involving searches of welfare recipients'
homes have described the intrusions as "minimal., 294 The conclusion that
these intrusions are minimal stands in contrast to much of Fourth
Amendment case law, which treats the home as a special place where
government authorities may not intrude without either consent or a warrant
supported by probable cause. For citizens other than welfare recipients, the
Supreme Court has been particularly protective of the home, handing down
a series of recent decisions holding that search of a home must be either
clearly consensual or based on probable cause. 295  For welfare recipients,
however, the privacy protections of the home are dismissed or diminished
by the courts.296
While some judges have argued that home searches by welfare fraud
investigators should not be viewed as searches under the Fourth
Amendment, these searches are properly viewed as searches under
established Fourth Amendment case law. Since the 1970s, welfare
Administering largess carries with it not only the power to conduct trials, but also the power
to inflict many sorts of sanctions not classified as criminal punishments. The most obvious
penalty is simply denial or deprivation of some form of wealth or privilege that the agency
dispenses. How badly this punishment hurts depends upon how essential the benefit is to the
individual or business affected.
Id. at 755.
294 Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Eligibility
workers are prohibited from opening drawers or closets during their walk-through of the
home. We conclude that whatever intrusion is involved is minimal, and is outweighed by
the government's interest in preventing fraud."). Minnesota appears to provide more
protections to welfare recipients. See Reyes, 472 F. Supp. 1218 (finding that both the Fourth
Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit suspicionless, unannounced home
searches of welfare recipients by welfare caseworkers).
295 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, in which Justice Scalia writes that "[alt the very core
of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With few exceptions, the question whether
a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (internal quotation mark and citations omitted); see also Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("At least since 1604 it has
been settled that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a government agent has no right to
enter a 'house' or 'castle' unless authorized to do so by a valid warrant.").
296 Steven Schwinn writes that these are not only violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but also violations of the Fifth Amendment's limitation on unconstitutional
conditions. See Steven D. Schwinn, Reconstructing the Constitutional Case Against
Mandatory Welfare Home Visits, 42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL'Y 42
(2008).
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recipients have typically had very little interaction with government
officials in their homes. While information gathering about the recipient
increased in the form of written and electronic information, welfare
recipients began to expect freedom from government intrusion into their
homes. Under the two-pronged Katz standard, welfare recipients certainly
had a subjective expectation of privacy from government intrusion in their
own homes. Supreme Court cases handed down over the last decade would
suggest that welfare recipients, like everyone other than parolees and
297probationers, enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy within the home.
In addition, the Supreme Court has also handed down cases making it
clear that law enforcement officers may not go fishing for criminal activity
among ordinary citizens going about their everyday lives.298 Searching the
homes of welfare applicants, and drug testing welfare recipients, is nothing
but fishing for wrongdoing. Welfare recipients are not treated as ordinary
citizens, but rather as presumptive criminals. For instance, Judge
Tashima's opinion for the majority in Sanchez cites Samson v. California,
where a Supreme Court majority of five upheld suspicionless home
searches of parolees based on the history of criminal activity and the
assumption that because of their status, parolees are more likely than
ordinary citizens to break the law.299
The special needs analysis applied in Sanchez seems particularly
wobbly. There is nothing "inherently dangerous" about welfare receipt as
there is in some of the other cases justifying special needs searches. 300 If
the weighty governmental need underlying suspicionless searches is
"program integrity," then suspicionless searches of any recipients of
government benefits amounts to a special need.30 1 The Sanchez decision,
297 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (validating warrantless searches of
probationers' homes).
298 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (finding that where
"the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
Amendment" and suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is meant to "prevent such
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life"); see also Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding warrantless, non-consensual drug testing of
pregnant patients--even patients at risk of drug abuse-to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
299 See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 928 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853-54).
300 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671-72 (1989)
(finding a special need for suspicionless searches where employees are involved in
interdicting illegal drugs and carry firearms).
301 Amy Mulzer writes that welfare verification procedures play a more complex role in
welfare policy than many people realize. First, they are a way to informally change
eligibility rules and ration benefits. Second, verification procedures serve "a symbolic
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though, cites no basis for assuming that applicants for welfare are more
likely to violate the law and cheat the government out of money than other
ordinary citizens. Moreover, welfare recipients are not "wards" of state
institutions like prisoners or minor students, two populations who have been
found subject to special needs searches. 30 2 And outside of parolees and
probationers, the special needs exception had never, until Sanchez, been
extended so far as to allow government searches of individuals' homes.
The lack of privacy rights afforded welfare recipients mirrors the
limited freedoms of parolees and probationers. In written opinions, judges
have been uncritical about how analogizing the status of welfare recipients
to parolees and probationers stigmatizes the poor and equates poverty with
criminality. The balancing of government interests in this context is
essentially a weighing of the interests of the taxpaying "haves" over the
privacy interests of the "have nots."
In the end, the Fourth Amendment's protection from search and
guarantee of privacy in the home do not appear to apply to welfare
recipients. Christopher Slobogin has written that there is a "poverty
exception" to the Fourth Amendment.3 3 Welfare recipients hold a special,
and inferior, status under the law-a status that positions them much closer
to probationers and parolees than to law-abiding citizens. But the decision
in Sanchez goes further: one need not be an actual recipient of welfare to
suffer these constitutional impairments. Simply applying for TANF
benefits and food stamps, before ever receiving them, curtails an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.30 4
function, expressing and reaffirming public ideas about welfare and welfare claimants."
Amy Mulzer, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification
Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 663, 710
(2005).
302 See supra notes 166, 271-272.
303 Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REv. 391, 406 (2003) ("[T]he Court's caselaw affords the poorer people in our country much
less protection of their privacy and autonomy than those who are better off.").
304 In 2007, Republican Member of the State Senate Tom McClintock introduced a bill,
S.B. 269, 2006-2007 Reg. Sess. (2007), that would mandate unscheduled home visits
throughout the State of California. At the time it was considered by committee, the Sanchez
case was on appeal, and the bill failed passage in committee. Given that the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari, thereby validating home searches of welfare applicants, it would not be
a surprise to see this bill re-introduced in California--or to see similar bills introduced in
other states.
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B. THE EROSION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Rules of procedural fairness have been denied to welfare recipients.
305
The crackdown on welfare cheats has raised concerns about a lack of notice
that criminal proceedings have begun, and a lack of clarity as to when the
investigative process ends and the adversarial process begins. Because the
line between the welfare system and criminal justice system has blurred,
many questions arise about when a criminal investigation has begun, when
a criminal interrogation has begun, and perhaps even when charges are
being brought.3 °6
Several concerns arise about the recent criminalization of welfare
offices. First, merging the physical space between welfare administrators
and fraud investigators, as well as the movement of personnel between the
two roles, creates confusion for welfare recipients, who cannot separate the
welfare system from the criminal justice system in their interactions with
the state. It also creates conflicts of interests where government employees
may not be clear whether their primary mandate is to provide for or to
punish the poor.
Second, it is no longer clear when criminal proceedings have begun
and, therefore, when a welfare recipient should have access to legal counsel
to ensure fairness. In Goldberg v. Kelly, one of Justice Black's bases for
dissent was that a right to a fair hearing would ultimately require a right to
305 California advocates for welfare recipients have lodged a number of complaints: that
welfare offices contact recipients' employers and disclose their welfare status, causing
recipients to be fired; that fraud investigators threaten children that their families will be cut
off aid if they refuse to answer investigators' questions; that fraud investigators stop benefits
without notice to recipients; that recipients who have been charged with fraud and who have
obtained counsel are questioned without counsel present; that fraud investigators secretly
tape interviews and offer them as evidence against recipients; and that eligibility workers
frivolously refer self-assertive welfare recipients for fraud investigations. Advocate Meeting
with CDSS Welfare Fraud Bureau - 4/18/06, CCWRO NEW WELFARE NEWS (Coal. Of Cal.
Welfare Rights Org., S.F., Cal.) July 3, 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.benchmarkinstitute.org/ccwro/CCWRO-06-08.pdf.
306 A number of years ago, I attended an administrative hearing in Alameda County,
California, requested by a welfare recipient to challenge her termination of benefits, which
had occurred without notice. In addition to a couple of officials from the welfare office, two
ADAs hoping to charge the woman with welfare fraud were in attendance. Also in
attendance was a welfare fraud investigator, though it was unclear whether she was
employed by the welfare office or was a deputized investigator working for criminal
prosecutors. The welfare recipient had no idea that statements she made could be used
against her in criminal proceedings, and had no idea that she could exercise her Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent in this setting. At the hearing, the welfare recipient had
representation, but not representation by a lawyer. (Anyone with adequate knowledge of the
regulations may represent a client in an administrative appeal in California. An individual
with knowledge of the welfare regulations, though, may not have knowledge of the
evidentiary issues or criminal issues involved.)
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government-paid counsel.3°7 Currently, however, welfare recipients are not
provided counsel in administrative hearings, even when those hearings have
308direct criminal consequences.
Finally, states often prefer criminal remedies even where both civil and
criminal remedies are available. In California, collateral estoppel precludes
the State from prosecuting welfare recipients who have been exonerated of
welfare fraud in an administrative hearing.30 9 In many instances, the State
avoids collateral estoppel by going straight for criminal prosecution unless
the welfare recipient herself files for an administrative hearing. In other
instances, the State apparently ignores stated law and attempts to take a
second bite at the apple even after losing an administrative hearing. 3' ° In a
recent, lengthy California Supreme Court dissent, Justice Ming Chin argued
that clear and strong legislative preferences for criminal resolution of
welfare fraud cases should serve as an exception to the rules of collateral
estoppel. 311 He also noted that informal administrative hearings merely
create additional risks for welfare recipients whose testimony may be used
against them in later criminal proceedings.31 2
Clearly, the criminalization of the welfare system is raising
complicated issues of procedural justice that are being inadequately
addressed. Charles Reich wrote in 1964 that "higher standards of
procedural fairness should apply when government action has all the effects
of a penal sanction." 313 Welfare hearings not only hold the potential for
penal sanctions, but increasingly lead straight to penal sanctions. Welfare
307 397 U.s. 254, 278 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963)).
308 Today, lawyers are rarely available to low-income individuals who are engaged in
administrative interactions with welfare officials. Legal aid attorneys give administrative
welfare appeals low priority among the many legal issues that arise among the poor. During
the late 1990s, when welfare prosecution rates soared in northern California, none of the
legal aid offices provided representation to welfare recipients during administrative appeals
because they had to prioritize resources and welfare hearings were subordinate to other legal
issues. Lack of legal representation is particularly serious for welfare recipients who have
misreported or underreported their income because statements they make at administrative
hearings, particularly admissions, may be used against them in criminal proceedings.
Collateral estoppel prevents welfare recipients from challenging any findings of fact in an
administrative hearing during later criminal proceedings.
309 People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 334 (Cal. 1982) (expressing concern that multiple, and
possibly inconsistent, judgments undermine procedural integrity).
310 People v. Garcia, 141 P.3d 197, 210 (Cal. 2006) (remanded on the collateral estoppel
issue for "determination of whether the issues litigated at the administrative hearing and the
criminal prosecution for welfare fraud and perjury were identical").
"' Id. at 213-15 (Chin, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 222-23.
313 Reich, supra note 293, at 784.
[Vol, 99
THE CRIMINALIZA TION OF PO VER TY
recipients should therefore be given clear notice, both written and verbal,
that statements they make during administrative appeals may have criminal
implications. They should also have access to government-paid legal
counsel in all proceedings that have the potential to lead to serious criminal
action.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The scope of this Article does not extend to recommendations for
systemic reform of the welfare and criminal justice system. But the
problems explained in the preceding Parts suggest some modest approaches
to reform.
A. DE-COUPLE WELFARE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS FROM WELFARE
PROVISION
Federal, state, and local governments should maintain a welfare
administration that is separate from welfare fraud investigation and
prosecution agencies. The combination of the two functions-providing
and investigating-creates conflicts of interests, with welfare administrators
focused on withholding benefits and catching cheats rather than providing
for the poor.
Welfare caseworkers should be housed in facilities separate from fraud
investigators and prosecutors. This physical separation will give notice to
welfare recipients when they become the subjects of criminal investigations.
Low-income families may be confused by the deputizing of welfare fraud
investigators; they may encounter the same individual as a benefits
caseworker one month and as a deputized fraud investigator the next. As a
result, welfare recipients may often be unaware when criminal
investigations are underway.
B. AFFIRM THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS IN
INVESTIGATIONS
Judges and legislators should recognize that being poor does not
relegate an individual to second class citizenship. Fourth Amendment
protections should apply to all citizens, whether rich or poor. Professor
Christopher Slobogin wrote that if there is a "poverty exception" to the
Fourth Amendment, it exists not because the Supreme Court Justices hold
animus toward the poor, but because they are blind to the interests of the
poor, and are instead concerned-perhaps overly so-with issues of crime
control. Slobogin argues that if "the Court thought more about the interests
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of the poorer segments of society when deciding its cases, it would have
structured a Fourth Amendment that is more protective of us all. 314
Protecting welfare recipients' privacy in the home from unreasonable
searches is an issue of concern to more than just the judiciary. Legislators
could move closer to guaranteeing basic privacy rights by repealing the
federal welfare provisions that allow law enforcement officials to access
welfare records and states to drug test welfare applicants.
As the boundary between public and private life is blurred, and as
issues of consent lose clarity, the probable cause doctrine is the only tool
that can protect the poor from being treated like criminal convicts and
becoming subject to state control.
C. ENSURE PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN THE HEARING PROCESS
As the welfare system becomes more and more like the criminal
justice system, procedural protections for welfare recipients should be
adjusted to keep pace. In particular, when welfare recipients are notified
that they have overpayments due to their own errors or misrepresentations,
they should also be notified that overpayments based on knowing
misrepresentation may result in criminal charges. Welfare recipients should
be informed that written and oral statements they make in response to
administrative notices may be used against them in criminal proceedings.
Likewise, they should be informed that any facts established in
administrative proceedings can be used as settled facts for any subsequent
criminal proceedings.
Welfare recipients suspected of cheating should also be clearly
informed of their right to counsel during administrative proceedings.
Moreover, given that negative findings in an administrative hearing may
carry the possibility of criminal charges and collateral lifelong exclusion
from welfare programs, welfare recipients facing overpayment claims
should have a right to government-appointed counsel.
D. CLARIFY FRAUD STATUTES AND ESTABLISH STANDARDS FOR
PROSECUTIONS
The criminal statutes used to prosecute individuals of welfare fraud,
and the standards used to determine which cases deserve criminal treatment,
differ drastically between states. Many states do not have statutes specific
to the crime of welfare fraud.315 Model welfare fraud codes should be
314 Slobogin, supra note 303, at 406-07.
315 Ohio, for example, has no statute specific to welfare fraud. Individuals accused of
welfare cheating can be charged with falsification, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2921.13 (West
2006 & Supp. 2009); theft by deception, OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02(A)(3) (West 2006
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developed to encourage consistency among states and to make it easier for
the Bureau of Justice Statistics to track welfare fraud as a specific
316category. Likewise, when reviewing fraud statutes, state legislatures
should take care to clarify that welfare fraud requires specific intent to
receive benefits to which one is not entitled, thereby distinguishing welfare
fraud from perjury. Zealous prosecutors are currently using this statutory
ambiguity to the disadvantage of welfare recipients who might have
unwittingly overstepped the complex rules and who might legitimately
argue mistake of fact as a defense.
Some states have created guidelines for pursuing cases in the criminal
rather than the administrative realm, while others have not. As a result, the
system has become arbitrary. Where prosecution decisions are left to the
discretion of local prosecutors, and where limited benefits prompt
widespread cheating throughout the welfare system, local discretion can
lead to both selective enforcement and racial discrimination.
Wisconsin, a state with some of the harshest welfare policies, has
virtually de-criminalized welfare fraud. For the last decade, the Wisconsin
Department of Health and Family Services has encouraged counties to
pursue administrative remedies or sanctions rather than refer cases to
county District Attorneys for prosecution. Since the early 1980s,
Wisconsin prosecutors have been reluctant to take welfare fraud cases and,
when they do, almost always resolve them through pre-charge or pre-trial
diversion programs. This reluctance is particularly interesting given that
Wisconsin district attorneys are locally elected and therefore vulnerable to
the influence of public opinion. Officials there have apparently decided that
welfare benefits are so limited and that prosecutions and restitution efforts
are so costly that criminal prosecutions are neither cost-effective nor
effective in deterring fraud. More extensive data collection and analysis
within and across states may help policymakers to evaluate the effects of
criminalization and de-criminalization of welfare fraud.
E. EVALUATE COSTS
Policymakers, agency officials, and academics need to consider how to
measure those welfare system costs that are externalized to the criminal
justice system. Numerous studies have questioned the community and
fiscal benefits of fingerprint imaging, welfare sanctions, lifelong welfare
& Supp. 2009); securing writings by deception, OHIo REV CODE ANN. § 2913.43 (West
2006); or unauthorized use of property, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.04 (West 2006).
316 Georgia is a state that specifically defines welfare fraud and that seems to encourage
prosecutors to enter into consent agreements, under which individuals who pay the state
restitution and meet other specified conditions will go without criminal convictions. GA.
CODE ANN. § 49-4-15 (West 2003).
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exclusions, and criminal welfare prosecutions.1 7 Local studies of the
savings associated with reducing the number of welfare recipients fail to
assess the costs that are externalized to other government programs.
Moreover, many fiscal studies fail to measure costs such as the effect of
punitive policies on families and communities, costs associated with
increasing the number of parents in the criminal justice system, the cost to
state and local governments of policing the poor, and the long-term costs of
stigmatizing government assistance and allowing poverty to go
unalleviated. Evaluators should develop a holistic accounting method that
examines both cost-shifting and the human costs of criminalization.
F. RECOGNIZE THE STRUCTURAL AND SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF
CRIMINALIZING POVERTY
While the intermingling of the welfare system and the criminal justice
system has largely gone unnoticed by the public, it has been applauded by
policymakers and approved by the courts. Nonetheless, this Article seeks to
highlight some of the practical, economic, policy, and constitutional
problems associated with the criminalization of poverty.
The recommendations above may give the impression that if the
government simply provides more procedural and constitutional safeguards
for welfare recipients, then all will be well. While the government should
employ appropriate procedural safeguards, this discussion of rules,
regulations, and procedures may distract governments and policymakers
from larger issues of power, ideology, and the individual's relationship with
the state.318 Though it may be impossible to pay heed to the "pull of the
policy audience', 319 and at the same time remain a critical outsider to that
audience, there is something about the criminalization of poverty that
demands both policy reforms and a larger analysis of the flow of state
power.
317 See notes 109-201 and accompanying text.
318 Critical scholars have long expressed their anxieties that engaging with policy
discussions simply reinforces law's hegemonic power over the oppressed, and fails to further
either social theory or social transformation. See generally Kitty Calavita, Engaged
Research, "Goose Bumps, " and the Role of the Public Intellectual, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 5,
7 (2002) (arguing that truly engaged law and society research is not myopically concerned
with discrete policy issues, but rather engages with macrostructural analyses and social
theory); Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL'Y 97,
102 (1988) (arguing that "[b]y addressing a policy audience, scholars speak directly to
power," but may ultimately serve to silence political and moral challenges to the power
relationships foundational to the policies).
319 Sarat & Silbey, supra note 318, at 99 (arguing that those who avoid the policy
audience are scholars who are "politically engaged without adopting the agenda of those
who currently make or administer policy").
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The criminalization of poverty highlights economically and legally
institutionalized ideologies of neo-liberalism, racism, sexism, and the
dehumanization of the poor. The growth of punitive welfare policies and
the policing of welfare fraud add up to something more than the policing of
crime. These policies and practices are rooted in the notion that the poor
are latent criminals and that anyone who is not part of the paid labor force is
looking for a free handout. In many ways, the policy goals of punishing
non-working welfare recipients, welfare cheats, and aid recipients who
engage in unrelated crimes has overwhelmed the goal of protecting poor
families, adults, and children from economic instability.
But adults as well as children are being harmed. More than forty years
ago, Charles Reich expressed concerns that the individual's dependence
upon the state was leading to the erosion of constitutional rights and
protections. 320 Time has brought the realization of those fears.
Social factors and problems, and the ways in which we understand
them, change over time.321  The language of pathology and crime has
become central to discussions of welfare policy, while the word "poverty"
has fallen out of use in the literature. The use of the term "welfare
dependency," now commonplace in public and policy discussions of aid
programs,322 has assumed a thoroughly negative connotation323 and is more
often used than the more neutral term "welfare use." In addition, the
federal and state governments and an expanding group of social scientists
and policymakers now use the term "recidivism" to describe a family's
departure from and return to the welfare system.324 Once a term generally
320 Reich, supra note 293, at 779 ("The most clearly defined problem posed by
government largesse is the way it can be used to apply pressure against the exercise of
constitutional rights. A first principle should be that government must have no power to
'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution.").
321 See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943 (1995) (describing the social and legal construction of understandings and outlining
techniques of transforming social meanings). While my Article is an attempt to map the
social construction of poverty, welfare, and welfare cheating, it is also an attempt to
transform our understandings of welfare in the process.
322 See, e.g., Shao-Hsun Keng et al., Welfare Dependence, Recidivism, and the Future for
Recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 9 (Iowa State Univ. Ctr. for
Agric. & Rural Dev., Working Paper No. 00-WP 242, 2000) (using the term "welfare
dependency" frequently).
323 See generally Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing
a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309 (1994) (exploring the term "welfare
dependency" and its negative connotations). See also Sanford F. Schram, Words of Welfare:
The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty 31-32 (1995) (explaining
that Liberals' adoption of neo-liberalism has led to their use of the term dependency).
324 See R. MARK GRITZ ET AL., THE SPHERE INST., GRANT No. 99ASPE-338A, WELFARE
RECIDIVISM AND USE OF NON-CASH AID BY WELFARE LEAVERS IN CALIFORNIA (2001),
available at http://www.sphereinstitute.org/publications/AspePARecidivism.pdf; Shiferwa
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limited in use to describe an individual's repeated involvement in crime,
recidivism is now the word that has displaced the neutral term "welfare
cycling," which most social scientists used before welfare reform.
32 5
There is something fundamentally and morally different between
imposing criminal penalties versus other types of penalties. Criminalizing
behavior serves an expressive social function.326 Given recent case law, it
seems there is little to prevent the expansion of the criminalizing of
behaviors and practices beyond the welfare poor. For example, what is to
prevent the same types of invasive and punitive reform associated with
TANF "program integrity" from being employed by the Social Security
Administration or by state departments of motor vehicles? Perhaps the
irrational animus now targeted at welfare recipients will not spread and
economically and racially privileged individuals will escape the creep of
criminalization. Today, when the U.S. economy is in decline, a growing
number of Americans are in peril of becoming not just economically poor,
but rights-poor as well. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment itself is being
compromised by the criminalization of poverty. Universal protections-
whether economic or constitutional-are meant to benefit us all. To ensure
those protections, we must disentangle the welfare and criminal justice
systems from root to tip.
Gurmu & William J. Smith, Recidivism Among Welfare Recipients: The Role of
Neighborhood and Access to Employment, 34 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 405 (2006).
325 See, e.g., MARY Jo. BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM
RHETORIC TO REFORM 40-41, 64-65 (1994) (discussing "welfare cyclers").
326 Kahan, supra note 204, at 415 (arguing that deterrence-based arguments for criminal
policies secretly mask "illiberal conflict between contending cultural styles and moral
outlooks").
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